The costs of suspicion: a critical analysis of the compensation scheme established by Article 85(3) of the Rome Statute by Mulgrew, Roisin
Mulgrew, Roisin (2016) The costs of suspicion: a critical 
analysis of the compensation scheme established by 
Article 85(3) of the Rome Statute. In: Research 
handbook on the international penal system. Edward 
Elgar Publishing. ISBN 9781783472154 (In Press) 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/32277/1/Costs%20of%20suspicion%20RM.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
This article is made available under the University of Nottingham End User licence and may 
be reused according to the conditions of the licence.  For more details see: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
 1 
  
Róisín Mulgrew, ‘The costs of suspicion: a critical analysis of the 
compensation scheme established by Article 85(3) of the Rome Statute’  
 
This paper was published as a book chapter (Chapter 19) in Róisín Mulgrew and Denis Abels 
(eds.) Research Handbook on the International Penal System (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2016) 
 
  
 2 
 
 
The costs of suspicion: a critical analysis of the compensation scheme 
established by Article 85(3) of the Rome Statute 
Róisín Mulgrew 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The ICC was established to prosecute and punish persons guilty of the most 
serious crimes known to mankind. To facilitate this objective, suspects are arrested 
and transferred to the seat of the Court and, often, remanded in detention throughout 
their trial. As with national criminal justice systems, international prosecutions do not 
necessarily result in convictions. Proceedings may be terminated for a variety of 
reasons and acquittals can be handed down at either first instance or on appeal. The 
Rome Statute (ICCSt), for the first time in international criminal law, contains a 
compensation scheme for arrested or convicted persons. 
Article 85 empowers the ICC to provide compensation for the deprivation of 
liberty in three situations: unlawful arrest or detention (Article 85(1)), wrongful 
conviction (Article 85(2)) and, in exceptional circumstances, acquittal or termination 
of proceedings due to a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice (Article 85(3)). As 
they reflect, and indeed, virtually repeat verbatim, existing and customary human 
rights remedies,
1
 the former two provisions are not controversial. Article 85(3), on the 
other hand, goes beyond contemporary human rights law.  
In contrast to the ease with which delegates at the Rome Conference were 
willing to accept statutory provisions that reflected contemporary international treaty 
law,
2
 there was no consensus in relation to the proposal to adopt a provision granting 
a power to compensate acquitted persons. Article 85(3) originated from a Japanese 
proposal at PrepCom to compensate persons pronounced innocent and those detained 
but never prosecuted.
3
 The lack of agreement on this power was demonstrated by the 
fact that the proposed provision was entirely in square brackets.
4
 States were 
concerned that such a power would adversely impact on Prosecutorial discretion to 
bring proceedings, and accordingly, if such a compensatory power was to be granted 
by the statute, that it should be restricted to instances of malicious prosecution.
5
  
Given these concerns and the fact that there was no legal duty to provide for 
compensation of this kind, Article 85(3) must be welcomed as an innovative and 
progressive development of international (criminal) law. The decision to include a 
                                                        
1
 See Arts. 9(5) & 14(6) ICCPR; Art. 5(5) ECHR; Art. 3 Protocol No 7 ECHR. 
2
 See Y. Kim, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary of the Rome Statute (Wisdom House 
Publishing 2003) 459; S. Zappalà, ‘Compensation to an Arrested or Convicted Person’, in A. Cassese, 
P. Gaeta and J. Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the ICC (Oxford University Press 2002) 1577, 1578. 
3
 W. Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford 
University Press 2010) 965. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Kim (n 2) 460. 
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statutory power to award compensation to acquitted persons or persons against whom 
proceedings have been terminated can be understood in light of the particularities of 
the international criminal justice system and the need to bridge a remedial gap in the 
international legal framework. The provision does not, however, grant a right to such 
persons and the judicial power to grant an award is restricted by a number of statutory 
and regulatory fetters.  
This chapter examines the scope of this new remedial power in international 
criminal law, analysing the reasons for its adoption, the limits on its use and the need 
to rethink the form and nature of the delivery of redress in this context. In other words 
it explores the legal, practical and personal costs of suspicion in the international 
criminal justice context for both suspects and the prosecuting institution.  
 
 
2. Reasons for adopting Article 85(3): the particularities of the international 
criminal justice context 
 
In addition to the general reasons in favour of adopting a compensation scheme 
for victims of mistakes of criminal justice process, there are reasons particular to the 
international criminal justice system that support the inclusion of this remedial power 
in the ICCSt. These particularities include the acquittal rate, the practice in relation to 
terminating proceedings, the use and impact of international remand detention and the 
difficulties encountered when trying to relocate acquitted persons after release from 
such detention. 
 
 
2.1 Fallibility of international criminal justice process 
 
If the facts and figures of the UN ad hoc tribunals provide an indication of what 
the ICC can expect, then it is clear that a compensation scheme for acquitted accused 
persons is a very welcome development. At both institutions, the acquittal rate was 
over 20% of completed cases. 
The ICTY issued 161 indictments. However, as 36 indictments were withdrawn, 
some cases are on-going and thirteen cases have been transferred to national 
jurisdictions – the number of completed cases is much smaller. Of the 97 completed 
cases to date,
6
 eighteen persons have been acquitted on all counts. Eleven persons 
were acquitted on all counts at first instance.
7
 Some of these acquittals were 
confirmed on appeal,
8
 and two acquittals were confirmed following a retrial ordered 
                                                        
6
 31 March 2015. 
7
 Dragan Papić, Zejnil Delalić, Fatmir Limaj, Isak Musliu, Sefer Halilović, Miroslav Radić, Ljube 
Boškoksi, Ivan Cermak, Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj. 
8
 Zejnil Delalić, Fatmir Limaj, Isak Musliu, Sefer Halilović, Ljube Boškoksi. 
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by the Appeals Chamber.
9
 Seven persons had their convictions (and sentences ranging 
from 2-27 years) reversed by the Appeals Chamber.
10
 
The ICTR issued 93 indictments in total. Of these, seven cases are on-going, 
nine fugitives remain, four persons were transferred to national jurisdictions and two 
persons died before the conclusion of their trial. Of the 71 finalised cases, fourteen 
persons were acquitted on all charges and released. At first instance, six accused 
persons were unanimously acquitted on all counts.
11
 Several unanimous first instance 
acquittals were confirmed on appeal,
12
 although some by majority decision.
13
 Some 
acquittals were the result of the reversal of convictions on appeal. Justin Mugenzi and 
Prosper Mugiraneza had their 30 year sentences overturned by a majority decision.
14
 
The convictions of Ndindiliyimana, Nzuwonemeye and Zigiranyirazo were 
unanimously reversed and a verdict of not guilty entered by the Appeals Chamber.
15
 
At the ICC, of the three completed cases to date, one (Mr Ngudjolo) has 
resulted in a unanimous acquittal on all counts at first instance,
16
 which was affirmed 
by a majority decision by the Appeals Chamber.
17
  
These figures reveal a high acquittal rate at international criminal courts and 
strengthen arguments in support of establishing a compensation scheme for acquitted 
persons. The provision adopted by the ICCSt is not, however, limited to instances of 
acquittal. 
 
 
2.2 Termination of proceedings 
 
Article 85(3) may also be used to provide redress to persons who have been 
released from detention following the termination of proceedings against them 
because of a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice. The case-law of the ad hoc 
tribunals provides some examples of scenarios that would potentially qualify under 
this heading. 
The majority of the 36 indictments withdrawn at the ICTY were withdrawn 
against indictees that were not in the custody of the Tribunal due to either their 
                                                        
9
 Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj. 
10
 Zoran Kupreškić (10), Mirjan Kupreškić (8) and Vlatko Kupreškić (6), Naser Orić (2), Ante 
Gotovina (24) and Mladen Markač (18), Momčilo Perišić (27). 
11
 Jean Mpambara, Hormisdas Nsengimana, Andre Rwamakuba, Gratien Kabiligi, Casimir Bizimungu, 
Jérôme Bicamumpaka. 
12
 Emmanuel Bagambiki and André Ntagerura (Trial Chamber February 2004 – Appeal Chamber July 
2006 - unanimous dismissal of Prosecutor appeal (following previous dismissal of appeal of acquittal 
in February 2006); Bagilishmena ICTR-95-1A-A (Judgment, 3 July 2002). 
13
 Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mehmet Güney in Bagilishema ICTR-95-1A-T 
(Judgment, 7 June 2001) – he agreed with the majority’s decision to acquit on some but not all counts. 
14
 Dissenting opinion of Judge Liu Dagun – uphold TC convictions in Mugenzi and Mugiraneza ICTR-
99-50-A (Judgment, 4 February 2013). 
15
 See Ndindiliyimana, Nzuwonemeye and Sagahutu ICTR-00-56-A (Judgment, 11 February 2014); 
Zigiranyirazo ICTR-01-73-A (Judgment, 16 November 2009). 
16
 Chui ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG (Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, 18 December 2012). 
17
 Chui ICC-01/04-02/12 A (Judgment on the Prosecutors appeal against the decision of Trial Chamber 
II entitled ‘Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute’, 27 February 2015). 
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(suspected) death or the re-evaluation of prosecutorial strategy to focus on high-level 
perpetrators.
18
 At the ICTR, the only instance where the charges were withdrawn in 
cases other than of persons who had deceased involved decisions to withdraw 
indictments to facilitate investigations and prosecutions by national authorities in 
Belgium.
19
 Several proceedings have also been terminated at the ICC due to evidence 
of the death of the suspect.
20
 Such cases would not fall within the scope of Article 
85(3). 
There were, however, some notable cases of indictments being withdrawn after 
indictees had spent time in international custody. At the ICTY, for example, Marinko 
Katava, Pero Skopljak and Ivan Šantić spent between 2 and 3 months in the UNDU 
following their voluntary surrender. Nenad Banović spent 5 months in remand 
custody in The Hague following his arrest. In all of these cases, the Prosecutor sought 
leave to withdraw the indictments due to having an insufficient evidential basis to 
justify or continue proceedings. In the decisions ordering their release, while the 
judges accepted the right of the Prosecutor to conduct investigations, they noted the 
emergency of such situations and warned the Prosecutor to in future ‘act 
expeditiously on matters of such fundamental importance as the liberty of the 
accused’. 21 Moreover, it was in the ‘interests of justice to restore ( . . . ) [their] right to 
liberty without delay’. 22  These situations (whereby indictees have spent time in 
custody before proceedings were terminated) provide examples of cases that could 
fall within the scope of Article 85(3). 
There have also been examples of the wrong person being remanded in custody. 
In 1996, Goran Lajić’s release from the UNDU and transfer back to Germany was 
ordered after the Prosecutor realised he was the wrong person.
23
 Agim Murtezi spent 
10 days at the UNDU following his arrest by KFOR in Kosovo, before being released 
after the realisation that this was a case of mistaken identity.
24
 These cases provide 
clear examples of situations that could and should fall within the scope of Article 
85(3).  
It is important to note, however, that Article 85(3) refers to the termination of 
proceedings, and not the withdrawal of indictments. At the ICTY, indictments were 
                                                        
18
 See ‘Order granting leave for withdrawal of charges against Nikica Janjic, Dragan Kondić, Goran 
Lajić, Dragomir Saponja and Nedjelko Timarac’ (5 May 1998); Statement by the Prosecutor following 
the Withdrawal of the Charges against 14 accused, CC/PIU/314-e (OTP Press release, 8 May 1998 
[Mirko Babić, Zdravko Govedarica, Gruban, Predrag Kostić, Nedeljko Paspalj, Milan Pavlić, Milutin 
Popović, Draženko Predojević, Zeljko Savić]. IT-95-15-I (Order authorising the withdrawal of the 
indictment against Zoran Marinić, 3 October 2002). 
19
 Bernard Ntuyahaga (ICTR-98-40) and Leonidas Rusatira (ICTR-02-80). 
20
 Kony et al ICC-02-04-01/05 (Decision to terminate proceedings against Raska Lukwiya, 11 July 
2007) [Uganda]; Nourain ICC-02/05-03/09 [Sudan] terminated by TCIV on 4 October 2013; Gaddafi 
[Libya] Terminated 22 November 2011. 
21
 See Katava IT-95-16-PT (Decision on motion by the Prosecutor for withdrawal of indictment against 
Marinko Katava, 19 December 1997). 
22
 See Banović IT-95-8/1-PT (Decision on the motion of the Prosecution to withdraw the indictment 
against Nenad Banović, 10 April 2002). 
23
 See ‘Goran Lajic returned to Germany’ (Press Release CC/PIO/090-E, 18 June 1996). 
24
 See ‘Statement on behalf of Agim Murtezi’ (Press Release P.I.S/733-E, 25 February 2003); ‘Agim 
Murtezi released following the withdrawal of the indictment against him’ (Press Release CC/P.I.S/736-
E, 28 February 2003). 
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withdrawn due to a lack of evidence without prejudice to the Prosecutor’s right to 
bring the same or similar charges again at some point in the future if sufficient 
additional evidence became available.
25
 This practice has been replicated at the ICC. 
In the Kenyatta case, the Prosecutor sought the withdrawal of charges due to a lack of 
evidence and the Trial Chamber’s refusal to grant an adjournment until such time as 
the Kenyan Government cooperates.
26
 Even in this situation, the withdrawal of 
charges was ‘without prejudice to the possibility of bringing new charges at a later 
date based on the same or similar factual circumstances’ on the basis of additional 
evidence.
 27
 
There have also been instances where the Pre-Trial Chamber has refused to 
confirm the charges against an individual without prejudice to the Prosecutor’s right 
to request confirmation of charges at a later date if additional evidence is presented.
28
  
Decisions declining to confirm or to withdraw charges (to date) have had a 
suspensive effect only. Moreover, this legal limbo does not seem to have a maximum 
permitted time-frame. As proceedings are not terminated, the indictment remains 
open. Formalised suspicion and stigma remains, as does the potentially indefinite 
threat of future prosecution and detention. This approach also bars such suspects from 
applying for compensation under Article 85(3). This is significant given that such 
individuals may have spent time in international custody pending the PTC decision. 
For example, Mr Mbarumshimana spent 11 months in custody at the ICCDC before 
being released five days after a majority decision by PTC III refusing to confirm 
charges against him.
29
 Reliance on, and the potentially excessive length of, 
international remand custody are important reasons to support the adoption of Article 
85(3). 
 
 
2.3 The use of international remand detention 
 
The compensation scheme established by Article 85(3) aims to remedy the 
consequences of grave and manifest miscarriages of justice. One of the most visible 
consequences of such an injustice is likely to be the excessively long period of time 
accused persons typically spend in custody pending finalisation of the case against 
them. For example at the ICTY, Zejnil Delalić spend 1 000 days in custody, mostly in 
isolation,
30
 before being acquitted on all counts at first instance (confirmed at appeal 
                                                        
25
 ‘Indictment against Milan Zec Withdrawn’ (Press Release JL/P.I.S/691e, 27 July 2002). 
26
 Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02-01 [KenyaNotice of withdrawal of charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 
5 December 2014) para 2. 
27
 Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02-01 [Kenya] (Notice of withdrawal of charges against Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta, 5 December 2014) para 3. 
28
 Abu Garda ICC-02/05-02/09 [Sudan] (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8 February 2010) 
para 236.  
29
 Mbarumshimana ICC-01/04-01/10 [DRC] (Decision on Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 
2011). 
30
 See S. Beresford ‘Redressing the Wrongs of the International Justice System’ (2002) 96(3) AJIL 
628, 629. 
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proceedings).
31
 Three members of the Kupreškić family (brothers Zoran and Mirjan 
and cousin Vlatko) each spent four years behind bars at the UNDU (6 October 
/December 1997 – 23 October 2001) before being unanimously acquitted on all 
counts on appeal.
32
 Naser Orić was sentenced to two years imprisonment at first 
instance. As he had already been in custody at the UNDU for longer than the sentence 
imposed (three years, two months and 21 days), he was released immediately.
33
 Two 
years later, the Appeals Chamber unanimously reversed his conviction, finding him 
not guilty on all counts.
34
 
Likewise at the ICTR, some individuals who were unanimously acquitted on all 
counts at first instance had spent five,
35
 seven,
36
 eight,
37
 eleven
38
 and twelve years
39
 in 
remand detention at the UNDF. When the cases of persons who were acquitted on 
appeal are analysed, the situation becomes more serious. Nzuwonemeye, for example, 
spent nearly 14 years in custody before being acquitted on all counts on appeal.
40
 His 
co-accused, Ndindiliyimana, had been released following sentencing at first instance 
as he had already served the sentence imposed (eleven years). Between them they had 
served a quarter of a century in custody for crimes they were found not guilty of 
committing.
41
 
This problem has continued at the ICC. Mr Ngudjolo was detained for nearly 
five years (7 February 2008 – 21 December 2012) before his release from the ICCDC 
following his acquittal at first instance. Although the ICC rejected the Prosecutor’s 
motion to have Mr Ngudjolo detained pending the outcome of the appeal,
42
 Mr 
Ngudjolo was placed in administrative detention by the Host State following his 
release (see below). 
The length of such detention, attributed to the ‘long and complex trials’,43 is 
aggravated by the difficulties involved with getting provisional release in the 
international context
44
 and the fact that such detention occurs in a foreign country. 
While there are examples of acquitted persons at the UN Tribunals who were granted 
                                                        
31
 Delalić, Mucić, Delić and Landžo IT-96-21-T (Judgment, 16 November 1998). 
32
 Kupreškić et al IT-95-16-A (Judgment, 23 October 2001). 
33
 Orić IT-03-68-T (Judgment, 30 June 2006) para 784. 
34
 Orić IT-03-68-A (Judgment, 3 July 2008).  
35
 Mpambara ICTR-01-65-T (Judgment, 11 September 2006). 
36
 Nsengimana ICTR-01-09-T (Judgment, 17 November 2009). 
37
 Rwamakuba ICTR-98-44C-T (Judgment, 20 September 2006). 
38
 Bagosora, Kabiligi, Ntabakube, Nsengiyumva ICTR-98-41-T (Judgment and Sentence, 18 December 
08). 
39
 Casimir Bizimungu, Jérôme Bicamumpaka. See Bizimungu, Mugenzi, Bicamumpaka, Mugiraneza 
ICTR-99-50-T (Judgment and Sentence, 30 September 2011). 
40
 See Nzuwonemeye ICTR-00-56-A (Motion for Compensation and Damages for Violations of the 
Fundamental Rights of F.X. Nzuwonemeye pursuant to SCRes 1966 (2010), MICT-13-43, 18 February 
2015). 
41
 See Ndindiliyimana, Nzuwonemeye, Sagahutu ICTR-00-56-A (Judgment, 11 February 2014). 
42
 ICC-01/04-02/12-12 (Decision on the request of the Prosecutor of 19 December 2012 for suspensive 
effect, 20 December 2012). 
43
 Rwamakuba ICTR-98-44C-T (Decision on Appropriate Remedy, 31 January 2007) para 29. 
44
 Provisional release was almost never granted in the early years of the UN Tribunals due to the 
inclusion of the term ‘exceptional circumstances’ in Rule 65, although this did improve for ICTY 
prisoners in later years. See A. Trotter, ‘Provisional release from international remand detention’, 
Chapter 2 in this volume. 
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extensive and numerous periods of provisional release,
45
 many (of these) accused 
persons were denied provisional release throughout their period of detention.
46
 
Accused persons at the ICC can apply for release pending trial, and any decision 
in this regard must be reviewed every 120 days.
47
 The legal procedure does not, 
however, address the practical and legal problem that the Host State is reluctant to 
facilitate the provisional release of international suspects onto its territory. The ICC 
has had to conclude bilateral agreements with third States to facilitate such release.
48
  
The realities of the international context mean that it is foreseeable that 
acquitted accused persons may spend longer in detention than a convicted person at 
the national level. While no-one would argue that such lengthy detention in a foreign 
country is not a serious burden to be imposed on accused persons, it has continually 
been upheld as lawful by international criminal courts.  
While detention infringes upon the right to liberty, this right is not absolute. 
Detention on the basis of a reasonable suspicion is an explicitly recognised ground for 
liberty deprivation in human rights law.
49
 International criminal procedure aims to 
verify that reasonable suspicion exists and thereby ensure the legality of international 
detention. In contrast to the procedure of the UN Tribunals, whereby an arrest warrant 
was issued after the judicial confirmation of an indictment,
50
 a Pre-Trial Chamber of 
the ICC issues the arrest warrant before a hearing for the confirmation of 
charges.
51
An arrest warrant can be issued where there are reasonable grounds to 
believe the person committed crimes and if it is necessary to ensure attendance at 
trial, to prevent the obstruction of investigations or the commission of related 
crimes.
52
  
Reasonable suspicion, however, only legitimises the initial detention. Continued 
detention requires additional justification on relevant grounds of public interest such 
as the prevention of the commission of further offences, flight of the accused, social 
disturbance or interference with the administration of justice.
53
 Significantly for the 
purposes of this chapter, it is important to note that ‘a subsequent acquittal does not 
render the earlier determination of a detention-justifying ground illegitimate’.54  
                                                        
45
 For example, following his voluntary surrender to the ICTY in March 2005, Momčilo Perišić was 
granted provisional release from the 9 June 2005 - 18 September 2008, and on these subsequent 
occasions before his conviction by the Trial Chamber in September 2011 (22 December 2008 – 9 
January 2009; 9-17 April 2009; 25 July 2009- 14 August 2009; 9 December 2009-14 January 2010; 23 
July 2010-19 August 2010; 23 July 2010- 19 August 2010). 
46
 See Trotter (n 44). 
47
 Art. 60(2)-(3) ICCSt. 
48
 ICC and Belgium. 
49
 Art. 5(1)(c) ECHR. 
50
 See Arts. 18(4), 19(1)-(2), 20(2) ICTYSt; Arts. 17(4), 18(2) and 19 ICTRSt. 
51
 See Arts. 58(1), 60(1), 61(1), (6) ICCSt. 
52
 Art. 58(1) ICCSt. 
53
 See Smirnova v Russia App nos 46133/99 and 48183/99 (ECtHR, 24 July 2003) paras 58-9; W v 
Switzerland App no 14379/88 (ECtHR, 26 January 1993) para 30; Letellier v France App no 12369/86 
(ECtHR, 26 June 1991) paras 35, 43, 51; Neumeister v Austria App no 1936/63 (ECtHR, 27 June 1968) 
para 10; Matznetter v Austria App no 2178/ 64 (ECtHR, 10 November 1969) para 9. 
54
 J. Michels, ‘Compensating Acquitted Defendants for Detention before International Criminal Courts’ 
(2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 407, 411. 
 9 
The repeated judicial affirmations of the lawfulness of such lengthy periods of 
detention by international courts, however, stretches human rights thresholds to their 
limits and such practice is viewed by many as a way of avoiding the need to 
acknowledge rights violations that would require the release of indicted or accused 
persons (see below).  
There have been strong dissenting opinions in relation to whether acquitted 
accused persons’ rights have been violated by lengthy detention.55 These opinions 
referred, however, to fair trial rights rather than the right to liberty. Even then, the 
focus was on the length of time taken to render judgment following the close of 
argument (three years; two years and ten months), and not the overall length of 
proceedings (which were considered acceptable due to their complex and litigious 
nature). Judge Short highlighted the fact that the right to trial without delay was 
important, not only to serve the interests of justice, but to avoid keeping accused 
persons in a ‘state of uncertainty as to their fate ( . . . ) [where] the Accused have been 
incarcerated without judgement for more than twelve years’.56 In this particular case, 
the two co-accused persons, who had been sentenced to 30 years in prison, had their 
convictions overturned by majority decision,
57
 nearly fourteen years after their arrest 
and transfer to the ICTR.
58
 
Therefore, even though human rights law recognises that detention for an 
unjustifiably long period renders it unlawful,
59
 the international criminal courts have 
relied on human rights jurisprudence that has accepted the lawfulness of lengthy 
periods of detention by national authorities in particular cases to justify an overall 
policy of lengthy pre-judgment detention. 
Although European penal policy explicitly warns against adopting such a policy 
in relation to foreign prisoners,
60
 lengthy detention is likely to continue to be 
considered necessary for the majority of internationally accused persons for a number 
of reasons: the gravity of the charges against them; their perceived risk of flight or 
interference with witnesses or evidence; and the lack of an international police force 
to secure attendance at trial by re-arrest.
61
  
                                                        
55
 See the Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Emile Francis Short, Bizimungu, Mugenzi, 
Bicamumpaka, Mugiraneza ICTR-99-50-T (Judgment and Sentence, 30 September 2011); Partially 
Dissenting opinion of Judge Patrick Robinson in Mugenzi and Mugiraneza ICTR-99-50-A (Judgment, 
4 February 2013). 
56
 Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Emile Francis Short, Bizimungu, Mugenzi, Bicamumpaka, 
Mugiraneza ICTR-99-50-T (Judgment and Sentence, 30 September 2011) para 6. 
57
 Dissenting opinion of Judge Liu Dagun – upheld the TC convictions in Mugenzi and Mugiraneza 
ICTR-99-50-A (Judgment, 4 February 2013). 
58
 Mugenzi and Mugiraneza ICTR-99-50-A (Judgment, 4 February 2013). 
59
 See Smirnova v Russia App nos 46133/99 and 48183/99 (ECtHR, 24 July 2003) para 62; Wemhoff v 
Germany App no 2122/64 (ECtHR, 27 June 1968) para 5. 
60
 See Rules 5 and 13 Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2012) 12 concerning foreign 
prisoners.  
61
 See Bemba Gombo et al ICC-01/05-01/13 OA 10 (Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against 
the decision of the PTC II of 23 January 2015 entitled ‘Decision on ‘Mr Bemba’s Request for 
provisional release’, 29 May 2015); Michels (n 54) 414. 
 10 
The presence of reasonable suspicion and the operational realities of the 
international criminal justice system are likely to ‘inoculate’62 international courts 
from the majority of claims for excessive detention. The judicial acceptance of the 
technical legality of such detention (or indeed, their refusal to acknowledge its 
unlawfulness) does not negate the very real and detrimental impact an international 
indictment and the resulting detention can have on accused persons and their families. 
 
 
2.4 The impact of international detention 
 
Whether the former suspect has been acquitted or had proceedings against them 
terminated, Article 85(3) can only be relied upon by claimants who have been 
detained by the ICC. Compensation under this scheme is intended to provide redress 
for consequences that derive from the detention associated with the grave and 
manifest miscarriage of justice.  
Persons who fall within the scope of Article 85(3) will have lost things that 
‘cannot be retrieved’.63 Acquitted accused persons have endured the loss of liberty, 
interference with their family life and careers, been subjected to the defamatory 
effects of global and public accusations of the highest form of criminality, the mental 
anguish of prosecution and the indignities of detention. Moreover, as Sheehy notes, 
the detention of an innocent person may have a more detrimental impact than the 
detention of a guilty person: the injustice of the incarceration inflicts greater moral 
harm.
64
 Vlatko Kupreškić (acquitted on all counts on appeal at the ICTY) explained 
that, ‘as far as I am concerned, four years of my life have been destroyed. My family, 
my mother and my businesses have been devastated’.65 International detention not 
only deprives individuals of their liberty and freedom of movement; it deprives 
people of the fundamental aspects of human life – relationships, personal and 
professional fulfilment. Moreover, it imposes negative costs, such as the loss of life 
opportunities and exposure to increased risks of physical and mental health issues.
66
 
While international detention regimes are very liberal, this does not detract from 
the fact that internationally accused persons are held in custody in a foreign country 
away from their homes and families, accused of the worst crimes known to mankind, 
with the uncertainty of their fate drawn out over many years. As Manns notes, ‘the 
psychological impact of the loss of liberty and degradations of imprisonment may be 
                                                        
62
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incalculable’.67  Unjust detention can ‘exact a heavy toll on its victims and their 
families’.68 The psychological trauma can result in depression, anxiety, paranoia, drug 
or alcohol dependency, withdrawal and estrangement, and in serious cases, post-
traumatic stress disorder and enduring personality change, that create severe mental 
health and adjustment problems.
69
  
The impact of detention is a subjective experience and is not, necessarily, 
directly related to the length of such detention. For example, Marinko Katava was 
detained at the UNDU for 2 months before the case against him at the ICTY was 
terminated. The trauma of his detention, in what was a very security focused regime 
at the time, led him to design and erect a statue in his home town, Vitez, to testify to 
the fundamental importance of liberty.
70
 
The impact of an international indictment on an individual’s reputation will 
vary depending on the circumstances. For example, Mr Kenyatta was elected 
President of Kenya while being investigated by the ICC. Even where an individual 
maintains a public role, this does not mean there have not been defamatory reports 
and a presumption of guilt. For example, Mr Delalić, who became a regional Minister 
for Justice after release, recorded over 400 news articles calling him an international 
criminal during his detention.
71
 It seems that ‘a person acquitted before an 
international criminal court is not an ordinary acquitted person: stigmatisation endures 
even after acquittal’.72 Unfortunately, this stigmatisation has more than reputational 
effects. For international acquitted persons, it can have serious legal and practical 
consequences that can result in continued deprivations of liberty and restrictions on 
freedom of movement. 
 
 
2.5 Relocation after release 
 
The process of adjusting to life after long periods of detention has practical, 
financial, emotional and legal dimensions. The released person may not have access 
to money, whether due to their assets being frozen, the cost of defence, the lack of 
earnings or pension, or the use of savings to support their families during their 
custody. Spending time in detention in a foreign country will put strain on family 
relationships. Many international detainees only receive visits once or twice a year. 
Even with the ICC’s more progressive and supportive approach to maintaining family 
                                                        
67
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relationships,
73
 communications are often restricted to letters and phone calls. 
Moreover, forms of adaption that are functional in the prison context may be 
dysfunctional and counter-productive in the post-release social and family context.
74
 
Released persons may struggle with feelings of estrangement and loss, and find it 
difficult to restore previously close relationships.
75
 There may also be, foreseeably, 
significant relational, psychological, financial and even safety consequences for 
family members, spouses and children in particular.
76
 
Readjustment may be even more difficult in a post-conflict setting. A study of 
50 former fighters released from Padema Road Prison in Freetown after proceedings 
against them were terminated noted that their release into a volatile post-conflict 
environment without support to reintegrate meant that they simply moved ‘from one 
form of confinement to another’. 77  Jefferson explains that this continuity of 
confinement was created due to a lack of security, stigma and marginalisation.
78
 
While some of the issues (freedom of movement and assembly) in this situation were 
caused by a lack of paperwork demonstrating that the individuals had no case to 
answer,
79
 physical release had not brought real freedom.
80
 
The situation can become even more complicated for persons detained at the 
Host State of an international court. Past cases have demonstrated the long-lasting and 
significant impact an indictment by an international court can have on an individual. 
For some acquitted accused, they have returned home quietly, others to a hero’s 
welcome. For others, the situation has not been so straightforward. Even when 
charges are dropped or an individual is acquitted, the international detention facility 
may not be able to release the individual immediately
81
 due to international travel 
bans imposed following an indictment.
82
 For some acquitted persons, the situation is 
much more serious than a delay in effecting release. For several persons acquitted on 
all charges by the ICTR, it meant moving from remand custody in an international 
detention facility (after pre-trial detention of seven - eight years) to custody in a safe 
house in the host State.
83
 The MICT has now assumed responsibility for the ICTR 
acquitted accused housed in Tanzania, some of whom have been seeking relocation 
for over eight years.
84
 Unable to return to their country of origin (Rwanda) due to 
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fears for their personal safety and the risk of persecution,
85
 and without the agreement 
of a third State to grant them asylum,
86
 they are confined to the four walls of a safe 
house in an unprecedented state of legal limbo. The restrictions placed on their 
movement and other rights mean that these acquitted persons consider the time spent 
in safe houses in Tanzania to be a continuation of their detention by the Tribunal.
87
 
These acquitted accused persons have ‘no travel documents, no passports, and no 
official legal status ( . . . ) [and] there is nothing in the Statute or the Rules governing 
the status or the social reintegration of the acquitted accused’.88  
There are both practical and legal obstacles. Without travel documents, these 
persons are restricted to making claims for asylum at embassies. However, as Heller 
explains, very few countries accept asylum claims made at their embassies.
89
 Even if 
the acquitted accused could access the territory of a State to request asylum, Heller 
notes that the State could refuse the request on the basis of the original indictment. 
The evidential burden required for an acquittal may still mean that significant doubt 
remains to their guilt which entitles States to invoke Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention which enables countries to deny asylum to persons if there are ‘serious 
reasons for considering’ that they have committed a war crime or crime against 
humanity.
90
 
In regards to their liberty status, they are no longer detained by the international 
court. But they are not free; they cannot freely move about in the host State and, 
indeed, there have been reports that the regime they are subject to in the safe house is 
stricter and less humane than the regime they were subject to in the UNDF.
91 
They 
remain separated from their families and friends. Despite their acquittal, these men 
continue to be viewed as international pariahs and genocidaires who pose a threat to 
order and security.
92
 In addition to the continuing stigma, these acquitted accused 
persons are ‘serving time for crimes they have not committed. They are paying an 
unfair price for having been suspects’.93 
Given the fact that it was foreseeable that similar issues could occur for the 
ICC,
 94  
it is disappointing that a stalemate situation arose in relation to the 
administrative status of Mr Ngudjolo at the ICC. Following his acquittal
95
 and the 
dismissal of the Prosecutor’s application for his continued detention pending the 
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appeal,
96
 Mr Ngudjolo was released from the ICCDC. The ICC Registry had planned 
to house Mr Ngudjolo in a hotel until such time as travel plans were made for him in 
accordance with rule 185(1).
97
 Rule 185(1) ICC RPE and Article 48(1) ICC HQA 
place an obligation on the ICC’s Registry to make arrangements for the transfer of an 
acquitted persons (or persons whose charges have not been confirmed) to a State that 
is obliged or agrees to receive the individual (or a State which has requested their 
extradition) and the Host State is bound to facilitate such transfers. These plans could 
not however be put in place until a UNSC Travel Ban pursuant to SCRes 1596 had 
been lifted, which required a receiving State to be found.
98
 What happened instead 
was that Mr Ngudjolo was arrested by Dutch police and brought to the airport to be 
deported back to the DRC.
 
Mr Ngudjolo requested that the ICC grant him protective 
measures under Article 68 ICCSt and his relocation to a non-African country, 
specifically Belgium to facilitate a request for asylum.
99
 In addition, at the airport, Mr 
Ngudjolo filed an application for asylum. While this prevented his immediate 
deportation, it resulted in his detention at an administrative detention centre for 
asylum seekers from the 21 December 12 to 3 May 2013. Although he was released
100
 
before the Appeals Chamber could rule on his request that the ICC require the Host 
State to release him into the ICC’s custody for the purposes of attending his appeal, 
the AC ruled that it could not have reviewed the lawfulness of this detention or 
ordered release as it was not the competent body.
101
 In contrast to the ICTR situation, 
Mr Njudolo was free to reside and move freely within the State upon his release from 
the retention centre.
102
 It is important to note, that the Registry was responsible for Mr 
Ngudjolo (and monitoring his whereabouts) since his release from the retention 
centre.
103
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This state of affairs has been blamed on a legal vacuum that arose due to the 
operation of two concurrent jurisdictions
104
 – the ICC’s appellate jurisdiction and the 
Dutch court’s administrative bench’s power to rule on the right to remain in the 
country. Yet, it would seem that there were very clear treaty and regulatory provisions 
in place that set out who was responsible for Mr Ngudjolo’s relocation (Rule 185 ICC 
RPE; Art. 48(1) ICC HQA). The ICC Appeals Chamber acknowledged this legal 
framework, ruling that the pending asylum application did not ‘negate the Registrar’s 
obligation to give effect to Mr Ngudjolo’s acquittal pursuant to rule 185(1)’ and 
instructed the Registrar to make transfer arrangements taking into account Mr 
Ngudjolo’s views, including as regards his security situation.105 This would seem to 
reinforce the logical conclusion that the ICC’s duty to relocate acquitted persons takes 
priority over the host State’s right to deport illegal aliens. The Registry accepted this 
responsibility and promised that it would do so once an appropriate place to relocate 
him to had been identified, and the travel ban had been lifted.
 106
 Interestingly, the 
Registry noted that should he be relocated before appeal proceedings, it would 
facilitate his appearance at status conferences requested by the AC by way of transfer 
or video-link.
 107
 
At this stage, his Defence Counsel asked ‘what would have happened if ( . . . ) 
[he] had not applied for asylum? He would have been deported irrespective of’ the 
governing legal framework.
108
 He felt that the ICC should have insisted on 
compliance or referred the matter to the arbitral tribunal stipulated in article 55(2) 
HQA.
109
 Perhaps the ICC should have done so, given that following the affirmation of 
his acquittal by the Appeals Chamber in February 2015, Mr Ngudjolo was re-arrested 
by Dutch authorities and transferred to the airport where a flight had been scheduled 
to effect his deportation to the DRC. This happened without the prior knowledge of 
Mr Ngudjolo or his legal representatives, and in spite of his claims to the ICC 
Appeals Chamber that he was unable to return to the DRC, or indeed any African 
nation on account of his cooperation with the ICC and his testimony incriminating a 
head of an AU state, President Kabila. He stated that as he was now ‘deemed a traitor’ 
he was at risk from attack from both military and non-military groups.
110
 The issue 
remains, again, with the Dutch immigration authorities.  
This event really undermines the bilateral treaty in place between the ICC and 
the Host State and creates a dangerous precedent for on-going cooperation in this 
regard. For acquitted accused persons (and the Court responsible for assisting them) it 
                                                        
104
 Basila (n 72) 3.  
105
 See Chui ICC-01/04-02/12 A (Decision on Mr Ngudjolo’s request to order the Victims and 
Witnesses Unit to execute and the Host State to comply with the acquittal judgment of 18 December 
2012 issued by Trial Chamber II of the ICC, 27 May 2013 (public redacted 12 June 2013)) para 13.  
106
 Situation in DRC’, Chui ICC-01/04-02/12-69-Conf-Exp (Public redacted version of Registry’s 
update on the situation in relation to Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 3 June 2013) para 5. 
107
 Situation in DRC’, Chui ICC-01/04-02/12-69-Conf-Exp (Public redacted version of Registry’s 
update on the situation in relation to Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 3 June 2013) para 7. 
108
 Basila (n 72) 5.  
109
 Ibid 6.  
110
 Appeals Chamber Transcript - ICC-01/04-02/12 - ICC-01/04-02/12-T-4-Red-ENG WT 21 October 
2014 1/85 SZ A. 
 16 
creates the danger of continued detention and uncertainty in relation to the very basic 
question of which country they will live in upon release. This situation is unfortunate 
given the existence of an explicit legal framework establishing who is responsible for 
relocating such persons. Yet the practical and political obstacle that they are released 
onto the territory of a host State is unavoidable. Given these very real difficulties, the 
inclusion of a power to award compensation to acquitted accused persons must be 
welcomed. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
Article 85(3) ICCSt is innovative and unique in the international legal arena.
111
 
It provides a power to grant compensation to persons who have been deprived of their 
liberty, despite the fact that proceedings were later terminated or they were found not 
guilty of all counts charged, for the first time in international law. This power is 
necessary in the international criminal justice system given the lengthy detention 
faced by many accused persons pending the finalisation of their trials. In addition to 
its excessive length, the impact of this detention is aggravated by its implementation 
in a foreign country away from family and friends and the stigma attached to an 
international indictment. This lasting stigma can have devastating results for the 
individual’s reputation, relationships, livelihood and, even (worryingly) their liberty 
and freedom of movement. The inclusion of article 85(3) attests to the recognition of 
the real, lasting and complex problems faced by the individual and his or her family, 
and bridges a gap in the remedies that were available to international courts. 
 
 
3. Bridging a remedial gap 
 
The adoption of Article 85(3) was important as it provided a statutory basis to 
address some of the problem outlined above, and in so doing, bridged a remedial gap 
in international (criminal) law. This section outlines the problems faced by 
international courts that did not have an explicit statutory power to grant 
compensation and the reluctance to grant traditional remedies demonstrated by the 
international judiciary. 
 
 
3.1 The consequence of a lack of inherent power 
 
While there are examples of national legislative schemes that provide 
compensation for the harm caused by the detention of persons who are released 
                                                        
111
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following an acquittal or termination of proceedings,
112
 there was, prior to the ICCSt, 
no such scheme in international law.
113
 Indeed, the current human rights law 
provisions upon which Article 85(1) and (2) are based exclude remedies in situations 
where the detention was lawful and the defendant was acquitted.
114
 Because of this, 
and the receipt of requests for compensation from persons acquitted on all counts 
following lengthy periods of detention, the Presidents of the ICTY and ICTR wrote to 
the UNSC asking for amendments to the Tribunals’ statutes that would facilitate such 
compensation.
115 
As the judges of the UN Tribunals acknowledged, Article 85(3) has 
no equivalent in international human rights law and it is not part of customary 
international law.
116 
That being said, these judges still felt that it would be in the 
interests of the Tribunals and the UN to award compensation to accused persons who 
are acquitted or who have proceedings against them terminated because of the 
‘particular circumstances’ in which the Tribunals operate and the long periods of pre-
trial detention faced by accused persons.  
It was unfortunate that this request was not accepted. Without an explicit 
statutory power to grant such compensation, the judges of these institutions felt they 
were unable to award a remedy in these circumstances.
117
 In contrast to the approach 
adopted where there has been a violation of an enumerated right, the judges of the 
ICTY and ICTR have rejected claims that they have an inherent power to grant a 
remedy in cases where there is no explicit underlying right, citing, inter alia, the fact 
that granting a remedy would go beyond their powers and create financial 
implications.  
The Rwamakuba case demonstrates this dual approach and highlights the 
significance of the inclusion of Article 85(3). Despite spending nearly eight years in 
detention before being acquitted on all counts at both first instance
118
 and on appeal, 
Mr Rwamakuba’s request for a remedy based on Article 85(3) ICCSt,119 was denied 
by both the Trial and Appeals Chamber.
120
 The Appeals Chamber agreed with the 
Trial Chamber’s finding that there was no internal legal basis for such an award 
(either in the internal positive law or case-law) and it was not part of customary 
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international law.
121
 In other words, the judges could not grant compensation for 
lengthy detention without an explicit statutory or regulatory provision or precedent 
upon which to base such an award. 
This can be contrasted with the practice of relying on an inherent judicial 
authority to award remedies in instances of violations of recognised rights. Indeed, 
this inherent authority was relied upon to grant Mr Rwamakuba monetary 
compensation and non-monetary assistance for violations of his fair trial rights.
122
 
This was in spite of opposition by the Registrar who argued, inter alia, that 
compensation could not be awarded in the absence of a statutory provision or rule, 
particularly given unsuccessful attempts by the Tribunals’ Presidents to have the legal 
framework amended to facilitate such a power.
123
 The Appeals Chamber, dismissing 
these claims,
124
 based the inherent authority to grant a remedy for violations of fair 
trial rights on the statutory duty to ensure a fair trial and respect for the rights of the 
accused (Article 19(1) ICTRSt), the need to provide an effective remedy for human 
rights violations (derived from ICTR and ICTY case-law and international human 
rights treaty law), and previous decisions noting the authority of the Tribunal to award 
financial compensation for human rights violations.
125
 Where enumerated rights had 
been violated, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s finding that  
 
internal institutional considerations related to the execution of an order, 
including budgetary matters, are separate considerations from the Tribunal’s 
authority to award an effective remedy in the form of financial compensation ( . 
. . ) Budgetary considerations cannot interfere with the Tribunal’s authority to 
award financial compensation as an effective remedy for a human rights 
violation.
126
  
 
Both Chambers in this case, however, rejected the argument that they had an 
inherent power to award a monetary remedy for wrongful prosecution. Indeed, the 
Appeals Chamber referred to the failed attempt by the ICTR President to seek such 
express powers and budgetary resources from the UNSC.
127
 Without a violated 
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enumerated right, there was no legal duty to provide an effective remedy. Without a 
legal duty to provide a remedy, there was no budget line to draw from. 
The rejection of an inherent power to grant a remedy in such cases has resulted 
in claimants at other tribunals arguing for a remedy on the basis of violations of 
established rights. In a recent claim submitted to the MICT by an acquitted accused 
person, for example, while Article 85(3) was referred to, this was only to make the 
point that a broader approach to compensation has been adopted within the 
international criminal law context. The legal basis for the claim submitted was the 
breach of fundamental and explicit rights (notification of charges and undue delay).
128
 
Moreover, the ICTR case-law outlined above was cited to support the argument that 
financial compensation could be paid for violations of the rights of accused persons 
even in the absence of an explicit statutory provision granting the judges the power to 
do so. 
In light of the difficulties experienced at the ad hoc Tribunals because of the 
lack of both an explicit and inherent power to grant a remedy in such circumstances, 
Article 85(3) is a significant addition to the Rome Statute. Not only does this statutory 
provision provide a clear legal basis
129
 for the judicial power and the funds required to 
implement it, the form of remedy granted, compensation, may overcome another 
problem encountered at the UN Tribunals. Sonia Starr calls this phenomenon 
‘remedial deterrence’. 
 
 
3.2 A means to overcome remedial deterrence? 
 
Without a remedial provision akin to Article 85(3), the defendant’s liberty is the 
only compensatory currency international courts possess.
130
 Convicted persons who 
have been detained illegally or for excessive periods due to delay can receive a 
sentence reduction.
131
 However, prior to judgment and sentencing, the traditional 
remedy for violations of fair trial rights and excessive or illegal detention is release 
with prejudice to the Prosecutor. At the ICTR, for example, the Appeals Chamber 
ordered that the case against Barayagwiza be dropped with prejudice for the 
Prosecution and the accused person’s immediate release because of the egregious 
nature of the violations of the accused’s rights (detention in Cameroon and the failure 
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to bring the accused before a judge at the ICTR for four months).
132
 While release 
was an ‘extreme measure intended as a sanction for the serious breaches of 
fundamental guarantees of which the Prosecution was found to be responsible,’133 the 
political reaction, by Rwanda in particular, resulted in the Appeals Chamber reversing 
its decision to order release in a controversial revision proceeding.
134
 It still held 
however that the violations of the defendant’s rights had occurred and if convicted, 
these would have to be taken into consideration in the determination of the sentence 
and if acquitted, that the accused should be adequately compensated for the unjust 
detention.
135
 As he was later convicted for inciting genocide, he was ‘compensated at 
the penalty stage,’ 136  receiving a reduced sentence (32 years instead of a life 
sentence).
137
 
A similar situation has already arisen at the ICC. The Trial Chamber in the 
Lubanga case decided to stay proceedings
138
 and release
139
 the accused person on the 
basis of the Prosecutor’s non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence (and its effect on the 
accused’s right to a fair trial), although the Appeals Chamber later overturned these 
decisions.
140
 
Starr argues that the traditional remedies of release and retrial may go beyond 
the restitutionary goal of human rights law and result in a ‘windfall’.141 Given their 
impact on the tribunals’ mandate, operational capacity and stakeholders’ interests, 
such remedies are untenable and prohibitively costly in the international criminal 
justice context.
142
 The practical and political constraints of a system based on State 
cooperation are so significant that the Tribunals ‘are institutionally incapacitated from 
ex post recognition of criminal procedure violations that are serious enough to require 
a significant remedy’.143 Accordingly, the costs of traditional remedies are resulting in 
the international judiciary narrowly interpreting substantive rights, erecting 
procedural hurdles and imposing high evidential burdens to avoid hearing or 
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accepting claims.
144
 This approach is evident in applications for provisional release, 
or claims that trials have been unduly delayed.
 145
  
Starr argues that, in the international criminal justice context, ‘an absolutist 
approach to the right to an effective remedy may be self-defeating’ as it may result in 
no remedy being awarded.
146
 Therefore, it is both appropriate and desirable to adopt 
an interest-balancing approach that permits departure from the requirement of full 
remedy in face of strong legitimate countervailing considerations related to the 
institutional objectives of and operational constraints faced by international courts.
147
 
As ‘defendants’ interests in broad rights and remedies cannot always trump these 
competing considerations,’148 she argues that international judges should be able to 
grant less costly partial remedies. This approach is preferable as it results in a remedy 
being granted. 
If this reasoning is accepted, it could be argued that Article 85(3) represents an 
interest-balancing approach to remedies in the international criminal justice context. 
Rather than continuing the judicial fiction that violations of fair trial rights or the right 
to liberty are not occurring (due to the high costs of traditional remedies for such 
violations), Article 85(3) gives international judges the power to award compensation 
to acquitted accused persons to deal with the harmful consequences of excessive pre-
judgment detention in international remand centres. As Trial Chamber III of the ICTR 
observed, the significance of the principle established by Article 85(3) ‘must be 
understood with reference to the right of any individual to freedom, including the 
corresponding principle that detention should remain exceptional or, at least, limited 
to what is reasonable and necessary’. 149  Indeed, the normative basis for the 
compensation of acquitted accused persons in many domestic systems is the need to 
try to counter-act the (exceptional) harm caused by legitimate government action 
resulting in detention.
150
 Counteracting the negative consequences of lengthy periods 
of remand detention therefore appears to the implicit foundation for the remedial 
power granted by Article 85(3).  
This approach is in line with European penal policy. The Council of Europe’s 
Committee of Ministers has recommended that member States provide compensation 
to ‘persons remanded in custody who are not subsequently convicted of the offence in 
respect of which they were so remanded’.151 Despite recognising that a legal basis for 
remand may have existed, the compensation is advocated on the basis of the non-
punitive nature of remand in custody.
152
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Michels argues that it is important to distinguish between distinct rights - the 
right to a speedy trial, the right not to be detained for an unjustifiably long period and 
any right to compensation for acquitted accused persons.
153
 As he rightly states, the 
two former rights operate independently from findings of guilt or innocence and the 
remedy granted deals only with the periods that exceed what is considered a 
reasonable period of time.
 154
 He notes that the latter remedy is awarded in relation to 
the entire period of detention. But, Article 85(3) does not provide claimants with an 
entitlement to compensation. This power resulted from a fusion of the normative and 
principled foundations of the human rights protections against undue delay at trial 
(right to a fair trial) and excessive detention (the right to liberty). In other words, it 
addresses the harm caused by encroachments on these rights without the need to find 
an illegal act or violation of an enumerated right. 
 
 
3.3 Operational efficiency and legitimacy 
 
Article 85(3) does not create a right but a remedial tool to deal with the ‘lawful’ 
but worrying (and almost inevitable) consequences of international criminal justice 
process. Article 85(3) is necessary to empower judges to counteract the negative 
consequences of international indictments, prosecutions and detention. This power is 
not only of benefit to the applicant, but it is likely to have collateral benefits for the 
operational efficiency of the Court, and ultimately its legitimacy.  
A compensation scheme of this type may result in caution and increased 
propriety in international investigations and prosecutions
155
 and induce ‘socially 
optimal’ 156  levels of remand detention. Research has shown that contrary to the 
traditional view that it is preferable that a guilty person is found innocent than an 
innocent person being found guilty, this principle becomes weakened, even inverted, 
in situations where persons are accused of serious crimes.
157
 The crimes under the 
ICC’s jurisdiction are of the upmost gravity and have affected large, if not 
immeasurable numbers of victims. A scheme that urges caution in a context in which 
a vocal and active victim lobby demands convictions should be welcomed. Despite 
the initial (political) reluctance to fund compensation schemes for persons indicted for 
international crimes,
158
 a scheme that results in a more cautious approach to 
prosecutions and the use of remand detention can make the international criminal 
justice system more cost-effective.
159
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
While Article 85(3) may ensure greater cautiousness and propriety in the ICC’s 
prosecutorial strategy and use of remand detention, this remedial power should not be 
seen as a substitute for recognising and remedying violations of enumerated rights, 
however costly these remedies may be for the international courts’ operations and 
mandate fulfilment. The strong human rights protection against, and remedies for, 
unlawful detention on account of its excessive length and unduly delayed trials are 
important deterrents against the abuse of coercive power (to prosecute and detain).
160 
Article 85(3) should not be used as a means to legalise or legitimise excessively 
lengthy detention or avoiding the costs of the true remedy for such rights violations 
by enabling international courts to essentially pay for human rights violations.  
The introduction of a judicial power to deal with the realities of international 
detention prior to the finalisation of proceedings is vitally important. It provides 
judges with an explicit power to grant a remedy in the absence of an explicit or 
customary international human rights obligation to do so. This explicit statutory 
power means that any sums awarded have a direct budgetary source. It ensures 
equality of treatment: convicted persons can receive compensation in the form of 
sentence reduction for violations of their right to liberty or a trial within a reasonable 
time.
161
 Finally, this power recognises that the legality of detention does not detract 
from its detrimental impact on the individuals subject to it. The ability of ICC judges 
to use this power has, however, been greatly restricted by thresholds and criteria 
established in the Court’s statute and rules. 
 
 
4. Eligibility for compensation under Article 85(3) 
 
Article 85(3) provides the ICC judges with a power to grant compensation to 
‘unjustly prosecuted’162 persons. This section outlines how this power is constrained 
by explicit statutory and regulatory provisions that create strict eligibility criteria. 
 
 
4.1 Statutory thresholds 
 
Article 85(3) contains several explicit criteria which applicants for 
compensation must be able to demonstrate. 
Firstly, the individual must have been released from detention following a final 
decision of acquittal or a termination of proceedings. Accordingly, a person who was 
not remanded in custody would not be eligible for compensation.  
                                                        
160
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Secondly, if the claimant has been acquitted, the acquittal must be final. The 
Prosecutor can appeal an acquittal on the grounds of a procedural, factual or legal 
error.
163
 An acquitted person may be remanded in custody pending the outcome of the 
appeal, although this should only be in exceptional circumstances after consideration 
of a concrete risk of flight, the seriousness of the offence charged and the probability 
of success on appeal,
164
 although any decision of this kind can be appealed.
165
 If an 
acquittal is not appealed, it typically becomes final after 30 days.
166
  
Thirdly, and significantly, the release from detention must have been ordered 
due to the discovery of a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice (GMMOJ).
167
 This 
term is not defined. The inclusion of both adjectives (grave and manifest) suggests a 
narrower cause of action than that created by Article 85(2) in cases of wrongful 
convictions.
168
 This implicit requirement of a higher tier of injustice is troublesome 
given that the term miscarriage of justice ‘connotes a failing of monumental scale’.169  
The deliberate inclusion of a narrower cause of action could be recognition of 
the fact than an acquittal (or termination of proceedings) is a remedy of sorts for 
mistakes in criminal justice process. However, as Sheehy argues, the concept of 
miscarriage of justice should cover all instances whereby the criminal justice process 
does not work properly, with serious adverse consequences for wrongly accused 
persons:
 170
 persons acquitted following a prior conviction ‘are merely further along 
the “continuum toward outrage”, as other categories of accused may suffer many of 
the same burdens as those wrongly convicted’.171 
When seeking compensation at the ICTR, Mr Rwamakuba and his counsel 
argued that a GMMOJ had occurred on the basis of two distinct grounds. Firstly, they 
argued that the Prosecution had relied on false and unsatisfactory evidence to arrest 
and prosecute him.
172
 The AC rejected this claim, stating no evidence or convincing 
arguments had been produced to substantiate these allegations.
173
 The second ground 
was based on the lengthy detention he had endured (due to failings in the collection 
and presentation of evidence) and the denial of his right to an expeditious trial (due to 
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denials of requests for severance).
174
This claim was also found to be 
unsubstantiated.
175
 Can it be inferred from this case that both grounds, if 
substantiated, would qualify as a GMMOJ at the ICC?  
There have been instances where Appeal judges have been highly critical of 
convictions handed down at first instance. For example, in the case of Protais 
Zigiranyirazo, a unanimous AC stated that serious errors made by the Trial Chamber 
in relation to their statement of legal principles and handling of key evidence resulted 
in a miscarriage of justice that invalidated the guilty verdict.
176
 Indeed, it held that the 
conviction at first instance had ‘violated the most basic and fundamental principles of 
justice’. 177 Is this the type of decision that will be required to constitute a finding of a 
GMMOJ? 
A further problem is caused by the statutory requirement for the grave and 
manifest miscarriage of justice to be demonstrated by conclusive facts. It is unclear 
what this will mean in practice. 
Will the decision releasing the detainee suffice or will a separate hearing be 
required? Rule 173(2)(c) ICC RPE refers to notification of the decision of the Court 
concerning the existence of a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice. This would 
seem to indicate that the determination of the existence of such a fact is a duty for the 
Court alone. But the importance of such a finding would seem to necessitate the 
hearing of the views of the persons alleging the miscarriage of justice. However, the 
requirement of a separate hearing may result in the creation of a potentially 
insurmountable evidential burden on the applicant. How do you prove a ‘grave and 
manifest’ miscarriage of justice has occurred?  
Further, will an acquittal based on a majority decision suffice?
 178
 This is an 
even more difficult question if these statutory requirements reflect an implicit 
preference for claims from persons who are (or at least appear to be) factually 
innocent (see below). 
For example the majority of first instance acquittals
179
 and those affirmed on 
appeal
180
 at the ICTY were unanimous decisions. In the case of acquittals on appeal, 
however, there has been more discord. While the Appeals Chamber unanimously 
reversed the convictions of Zoran, Mirjan and Vlatko Kupreškić, 181  Judge Liu 
disagreed with the majority decision to reverse Momčilo Perišić’s conviction (and 27 
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year sentence).
182
 In the Gotovina and Markač case, the acquittal came as the result of 
a slim 3-2 decision.
183 
In their dissenting opinions, Judge Agius and Judge Pocar were 
not only extremely critical of the majority’s reasoning and verdict, 184  they were 
perplexed as to why convictions had not been entered under alternate modes of 
liability.
185
 Judge Meron ruled out this course of action on the basis that it would be 
unfair to the appellants to be found guilty of crimes that were different from those 
they defended against,
186
 while Judge Robinson ruled it out as the fact finding 
required for new convictions did not come within the appellate function.
187
 These 
comments do not necessarily reflect a view that the appellants were considered to be 
factually innocent. 
A similar situation arose at the ICC. Although Mr Ngudjolo’s unanimous first 
instance acquittal
188
 was affirmed on appeal, this affirmation was also the result of a 
bare majority decision. While three judges affirmed the first instance decision on the 
basis that it had not been materially affected by a procedural, factual or legal error,
189
 
Judge Tarfusser and Judge Trendafilova were highly critical of the majority’s review 
of the alleged errors made by the Trial Chamber and concluded that the acquittal 
should have been reversed or amended and a re-trial ordered pursuant to Article 83(2) 
ICCSt.
190
 
Do conclusive facts of a GMMOJ exist when a minority of judges express a 
view that, due to the gravity of the errors made by the Trial Chamber in reaching a not 
guilty verdict,
191
 a re-trial should be ordered? At the ICTY, Judge Robinson noted that 
a re-trial (an exceptional measure) would not be appropriate if it would be unduly 
oppressive to the appellants – which would be the case if the accused had already 
spent long periods of time in custody
192
 and a retrial would be lengthy and 
expensive.
193
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This view did not prevent the ICTY Appeals Chamber, by majority decision, 
granting the Prosecutor’s appeal of an acquittal in the case of Haradinaj, Balaj and 
Brahimaj and ordering a re-trial to facilitate the testimony of Prosecution 
witnesses.
194
 Judge Robinson felt that as the case had already been extended several 
times on account of the Prosecutor’s concerns about witness intimidation, ordering a 
retrial went beyond the powers of the Appeals Chamber and constituted a dangerous 
precedent as it prioritised the Prosecution’s right to present its case over the accused’s 
right to an expeditious trial.
195
 Although TCI had unanimously acquitted Haradinaj 
(and ordered his release),
196
 and acquitted Balaj by a majority (and ordered his 
transfer back to serve the sentence he was serving prior to transfer to the ICTY),
197
 
the AC ordered that they be remanded in custody pending the outcome of the 
retrial.
198
 The new trial chamber unanimously acquitted these parties on all counts 
contained in the retrial indictment.
199
 These parties faced seven years of uncertainty in 
relation to their fate. Does this make it a conclusive case of a GMMOJ? Does an 
acquitted person who has to be returned to serve a sentence for murder qualify for 
compensation under a discretionary scheme? 
It is clear that the statutory provision lacks clarity in relation to defining 
elements of the compensation scheme it establishes. Rather than add clarity, the rules 
that provide the detail for the operation of the scheme create further hurdles for 
claimants to overcome. 
 
 
4.2 Regulatory requirements 
 
The procedure for requesting and awarding compensation is set out in Rules 173 
and 174. These rules contain several requirements that may become procedural bars 
for applicants. 
The rules establish a strict six month time-frame for applications.
200
 While a 
short time-frame can ensure potential claimants seek redress in a timely fashion, 
closing the claim for the ICC within a reasonable period,
201
 there is a danger that it 
does not allow sufficient time for claimants to collate the evidence they need to 
substantiate their claim.
202
 This is particularly true given the context: claimants will 
just have been released from international custody in a foreign country after a 
wrongful prosecution.
203
 The six month time-frame, although replicated by the 
STL,
204
 seems short when compared to national law. For example, in Bosnia-
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Herzegovina, acquitted persons have three years to submit a claim for compensation 
to the State-level Ministry of Justice.
 205
 The statute of limitations ranges from 
between 1-10 years in statutory compensation schemes for wrongful conviction in the 
US, with an average of 2.6 years (although the Innocence Project recommends 3 
years).
206
  
Debates during the drafting of the statute show that there was a lack of clarity 
about what the starting point for this time-frame should be.
207
 The rules state that the 
time begins to run from the date the applicant was notified about ‘the decision of the 
Court concerning ( . . . ) the existence of a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice 
under Article 85, paragraph 3’.208 It is unclear if this rule introduces a requirement for 
the acquittal or decision terminating proceedings to explicitly state that there has a 
grave and manifest miscarriage of justice, or if, following an acquittal or termination 
of proceedings and an indication from the acquitted person that they intend to apply 
for compensation, a chamber must sit to decide if that case qualifies. 
The fact that the request must be made to the Presidency in writing (Rule 
173(1)) would support a view that the request must occur after the proceedings that 
resulted in the acquittal or termination of proceedings.
209
 Some argue that it would be 
more reasonable to have deliberations on compensation decided by the same Chamber 
that acquits the individual or terminates proceedings, as this would speed up the 
decision and reduce the burden on the Court by reducing the number of ‘micro-
proceedings unrelated to the main object of its jurisdiction’. 210  However this 
expedited format is excluded by the regulatory direction that the Chamber that 
decides upon eligibility and compensation must be composed with judges who have 
not participated in any previous judgment involving the applicant.
211
 Although the 
term ‘judgment’ is used in the English version, reference to the French version 
suggests that the drafters’ intention was to preclude the involvement of judges 
involved in any relevant decision by the Court at any stage of proceedings.
212
  
The written request must set out the grounds for the claim and state the amount 
of compensation sought (Rule 173(3)). An earlier requirement for applicants to 
submit [written] evidence substantiating the amount sought was deleted as it was 
considered burdensome and vague. However, it is likely that this will be required in 
practice by those seeking compensation under Article 85(3) as they have no right to 
such remedy, and so must persuade the judges that they fulfil the criteria and that their 
case represents a sufficiently exceptional circumstance for the judges to exercise their 
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discretion.
213
 Claims at other international courts for compensation for violations of 
the right to liberty or right to a speedy trial have failed or been unsuccessful in 
securing the amount sought
214
 due to a failure to clearly set out the heads of and 
provide evidence to prove claims and establish causality.
215
 
Finally, it seems that only the direct victim of the grave and manifest 
miscarriage of justice can apply for compensation. Although the rules state that 
‘anyone seeking compensation’ can submit a request (Rule 173(1)), Article 85(3) only 
refers to the person who has been released from detention following a final decision 
of acquittal or a termination of proceedings. Relatives and heirs do not seem to have 
standing to make such a request, either in their own right or on behalf of their 
(deceased) relative. This restricted standing can be distinguished from the broader 
approach adopted in relation to applications to revise a conviction or sentence under 
Article 84, which can be exercised by close family members.
216
 Zappalà has 
suggested that, in cases where the victim has died, the Prosecutor should file a request 
on their behalf.
217
 While it is clear that the primary claimant should be the direct 
victim of the wrongful detention, there are no obvious reasons why close relatives and 
heirs should not be entitled to claim on the victim’s behalf. In any case, in the event of 
a death, relatives should be able to pursue a submitted claim and receive any sums 
granted.
218
 As it stands, however, it seems that claims for non-victims will be deemed 
inadmissible. 
 
 
5. Determining Eligibility Claims 
 
In addition to the strict eligibility criteria established by the statute and rules, 
this legal framework also imposes restrictions on the judicial discretion to award 
compensation. This section outlines the procedure for determining eligibility and 
analyses the fetters on judicial decision-making before advocating a reconsideration 
of this cautious approach. 
 
 
5.1 Procedure 
 
The Presidency’s role in relation to implementing Article 85(3) is ‘a purely 
administrative one ( . . . ) the Presidency has no power to reject the request and only 
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designates a Chamber to consider the request’.219 Bitti suggests that the use of the 
word ‘designates’220 means the Presidency should nominate an existing three judge 
Chamber (either a Pre-Trial or a Trial Chamber).
 221
 The designated Chamber can 
decide whether to hold a hearing or to determine the matter on the basis of the request 
and any written submissions from the Prosecutor or the applicant. Importantly, Rule 
174(2) also states that a hearing must be held if so requested by either the Prosecutor 
or the applicant. This was added to avoid violating human rights in relation to the 
requirements of a fair trial.
222
 The STL rules differ in this regard: while the Chamber 
may hear the Prosecutor’s views, the rules do not give the applicant the right to be 
heard.
223
  
The applicant is entitled to legal assistance during the procedure (whether there 
is a hearing or not).
224
 This provision was necessary given that the statutory right to 
assistance (Article 67) only extends to accused persons awaiting the determination of 
charges against them. What is not clear is whether or not this assistance will be 
provided for free. Human rights law would suggest that legal aid should be granted in 
such compensation claims if the applicant lacks means, it is necessary to ensure 
access to a court and to ensure equality of arms (especially in complex procedures). 
Bitti has argued that these factors would suggest that legal aid must be granted for 
indigent applicants claiming under Article 85(3) to ensure he or she is not placed ‘at a 
substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the Prosecutor’.225  
The decision on eligibility (and any award) must be made by majority decision 
(Rule 174(3)). The rules do not state that this decision be made public. This is in 
contrast to a human rights approach to due process and statutory directions in relation 
to other pronouncements of chambers of the Court.
 226
 This is also unfortunate given 
the need to remove the stigma that attaches to wrongly accused persons.  
The rules also fail to state that the decision needs to be reasoned. This issue was 
actually debated at length during the drafting of the statute. Unfortunately the 
requirement to provide reasons was deleted following a request from the Russian and 
Spanish delegation due to a perception that, as there was no right to such 
compensation, the judges should not be burdened with a requirement to set out their 
reasons.
 227
 This is disappointing from a due process perspective, and seems contrary 
to contemporary human rights law.
228
 It is also unfortunate given that there is no 
practice in this regard to draw from. Moreover, human rights jurisprudence on 
compensation for unlawful detention and wrongful convictions has been criticised for 
its lack of analysis and a failure to articulate the principles governing the 
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determination of awards.
229
 The ICC should make its reasons for determining whether 
an individual is eligible for compensation clear. The judges should deliver reasoned 
decisions to ensure transparency and the development of a coherent set of principles 
on compensation. 
Other delegates felt there was no need to include reasons for decisions, as they 
are final: decisions cannot be appealed.  
 
 
5.2 Judicial discretion, exceptional circumstances and the consequences of assessing 
factual innocence 
 
In contrast to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 85, which incorporate existing 
human rights remedies and provide directly accessible rights, paragraph 3 grants a 
judicial power to consider claims. In addition to the criteria discussed above, this 
discretion is further fettered by the statutory direction that the power to grant 
compensation should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances. This not only 
narrows the scope of the field, but it may also require an enquiry into the factual 
innocence of the claimant. 
Limitations are often included in compensation schemes to try to prevent 
persons found not guilty due to a technicality or those considered factually guilty 
from receiving compensation. As Sheehy points out, ‘factual innocence ( . . . ) plays a 
central role in ( . . . ) compensation claims, restricting the right to have a claim heard, 
acting as a device for burden allocation and ‘gatekeeping’ and determining 
deservedness of ( . . . ) compensation’.230 Just as it is possible to wrongfully convict, 
criminal justice process may also result in wrongful acquittals.
231
 Indeed, this 
potentiality is recognised by the ICCSt; it enables the Prosecutor to appeal an 
acquittal
232
 and the Appeals Chamber to reverse the acquittal or order a re-trial if the 
first instance decision was unreliable or materially affected by a procedural, factual or 
legal error.
233
 In the context of international criminal trials in particular, there will be 
little support for a system that provides financial gains to persons who are considered 
to be factually guilty. As Beresford notes, however, ‘an effective way to separate the 
truly innocent from those found not guilty has yet to be discovered’. 234 The statutory 
right to be presumed innocent results in the onus being placed on the Prosecutor to 
prove an accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.235 Any requirement of proof of 
innocence from the claimant inverts this principle, reverses the burden of proof and 
risks undermining not only the presumption of innocence, but also the acquittal 
judgment itself.  
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The Statute states that it is for the Court to find the facts that there has been a 
grave and manifest miscarriage of justice. In the absence of a prior judicial 
determination of such facts, however, it is likely that the applicant will have to 
provide evidence. As Beresford notes, a claimant may not be able to prove his 
innocence due to factors beyond his control, such as the death of a witness.
236
 In 
addition, as previously mentioned, the judges that decide on eligibility cannot have 
participated in any previous judgment regarding the applicant.
237
 While it is true that 
‘judicial impartiality is both an essential organizing component of any legitimate 
judicial institution and a core right for persons brought before such an institution,’238 
this requirement may result in not only another proceeding, but also another review of 
the facts to determine whether the prosecution and subsequent detention was indeed a 
grave and manifest miscarriage of justice. A requirement of proof of innocence may 
therefore result in a further trial during which an individual who has already ‘had to 
fight for their acquittal ( . . . ) [having] to prove their innocence to a higher standard 
still’.239 
A requirement to prove innocence could be ‘disastrous for the administration of 
justice’, 240  as it would create two classes of acquittal: ‘real’ acquittal when 
compensation is awarded, and acquittal without compensation that would be tainted 
with a presumption of guilt.
241
 A refusal to award compensation to an acquitted 
person on the basis of continuing suspicions would have a potential defamatory 
effect
242
 that would impose ‘a reputational cost ( . . . ) [and] increased social 
stigma’.243 Such a scheme creates a risk of re-victimising claimants and deterring 
eligible persons from applying
244
 by introducing a ‘de facto verdict of not proven ( . . . 
) [or] probable guilt’.245  
The ECtHR has been highly critical of requirements of this kind in national 
compensation schemes. In Austria, for example, claimants had to dispel suspicions in 
order to receive compensation, and in Norway, claimants had to show that it was 
probable that they did not carry out the act that formed the basis of the charge.
246 
These requirements have been repeatedly criticised by the ECtHR, as a judicial 
determination that there is continuing suspicion as to guilt undermines the 
presumption of innocence protected by the Convention and violates Article 6.
247
 In an 
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attempt to bring their law in line with these findings, Austrian and Norwegian law 
now states that compensation cannot be refused or reduced on the basis of suspicions 
if the accused person has been acquitted by a final decision on the merits.
248
 This 
jurisprudence has not, however, prevented the likelihood of guilt being a factor in 
judicial determinations; simply the explicit acknowledgement of the influence of this 
probability.
249
 
National practice has demonstrated that a requirement to prove innocence often 
creates a higher evidential burden for those claiming compensation than is required to 
avoid conviction.
250
 In compensation statutes in the US, the most common burden of 
proof is ‘clear and convincing evidence’.251 For Article 85(3), ‘conclusive facts’ of a 
grave and manifest miscarriage of justice are required. Zappalà has suggested that 
what will be required is not so much a determination of factual innocence but ‘a more 
concrete judgment as to the overall justice of the outcome of the proceedings’.252 
What this means in practice, however, is not clear. Moreover, this appears to imply 
that a higher standard than ‘on the balance of probabilities’ is required. In fact, a 
requirement of conclusive facts seems more akin to a requirement to prove that a 
grave and manifest miscarriage of justice has occurred beyond reasonable doubt. 
A due process approach would reject the imposition of such a heavy burden on 
claimants and insist that ‘the only appropriate test is one based on the merits of the 
claim.’ 253  Indeed some would contend that compensation should be based on a 
broader (legal) notion of innocence that connotes that the presumption of innocence 
has prevailed.
254
 According to Zappalà, the very fact that a grave and manifest 
miscarriage of justice has been found to have occurred should constitute an 
exceptional circumstance, and therefore, perhaps the draftsperson uses exceptional 
circumstances ‘more as a wish than a limitation of the scope of the rule’.255 
 
 
5.3 Reconsidering the restrictions on judicial discretion 
 
Article 85(3) is a welcome addition to the ICCSt. It introduces the potential to 
grant a remedy to persons who were not previously entitled to redress under 
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international law. However, as the ICTR judges recognised, Article 85(3) is a 
‘narrowly drafted provision’.256 The contribution this compensation scheme can make 
to international policy and practice is limited by the inclusion of explicit and 
excessive restrictions. This scheme entails a number of weaknesses, including ‘strict 
eligibility requirements, high standards of proof, numerous disqualifiers and short 
time limits’.257 Moreover, the judicial discretion it grants is severely fettered by the 
requirement of the virtually insurmountable threshold of exceptional circumstances.
258
 
As Sheehy notes, ‘deciding who is eligible to claim for compensation will be a 
defining element of any compensation scheme’. 259 The current threshold however 
seems to raise the bar for eligibility too high. The legal framework currently in place 
creates a multi-tiered system to determine eligibility that considerably narrows the 
field of claimants that will qualify. In fact, Triffterer feels that the current thresholds 
will mean that ‘ordinarily no compensation will be paid to persons acquitted by the 
Court, or against whom proceedings have been terminated before final judgment.’260 
This threshold will deter potential claimants and risks violating the presumption of 
innocence and undermining the integrity of the Court’s judgments. Moreover, a 
system that operates on the basis of unreasoned decisions, that cannot be appealed, 
lacks transparency and fails to uphold the principle of equal treatment.
261
  
To overcome these problems, the current legal framework should be revised and 
amended. The most important amendment would be the removal of the terms ‘grave 
and manifest’ used to describe the miscarriage of justice and ‘exceptional 
circumstances’. Both terms convey the drafters’ desire to restrict the scheme. 262 
However, as some delegates at the Rome Conference agreed,
263
 these requirements 
unnecessarily restrict the judicial power to make awards. The current test imposes a 
burden that ‘may prove insurmountable, except to applicants who were the victims of 
the most abhorrent cases of prosecutorial misconduct.’264 Rather than restrict initial 
eligibility, a better approach is for the statutory provision to create a cause of action, 
leaving decisions about deservedness (based on the merits) to the judiciary. Michels 
has recommended a similar course of action, advocating a discretionary power to 
award compensation to persons released from detention following a final decision of 
acquittal, where it is in the interests of justice to do so.
265
  
In contrast to the restrictions on eligibility found in the ICCSt, the Council of 
Europe has suggested that eligibility should be curtailed in situations where ‘either the 
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person remanded had, by his or her behaviour, actively contributed to the 
reasonableness of the suspicion that he or she had committed an offence or he or she 
had deliberately obstructed the investigation of an alleged offence’.266 In other words, 
compensation would not be required where ‘the behaviour of such persons may have 
had a significant influence on the decision to remand them in custody’. 267  An 
approach that bars claims from persons whose own (intentional or negligent) actions 
resulted in their detention or its prolongation can be found in national legislative 
schemes in Europe (Austria, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands).
268
 Caution 
should be used when using attribution as a bar to eligibility given the risk of pressure 
from prosecutors or bad legal advice.
269
 Rather than act as a bar, attributability could 
be used to reduce the quantum of any award granted to claimants whose acts or 
omissions contributed to their detention.
270
 The curtailment of entitlement to redress 
on the basis of attribution of responsibility (as with the ICC and human rights 
approach to wrongful convictions)
271
 and reference to the legal grounds for remand 
detention seems more appropriate than a restriction based on political and pragmatic 
concerns.  
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
If ‘grave and manifest’ and ‘exceptional circumstances’ are retained, these 
terms must be defined and concrete tests established to determine if they exist. What 
length of detention or degree of prosecutorial impropriety is it necessary to establish 
to meet these thresholds? A practice direction or set of guidelines should be 
developed. Precise definitions and principles to govern decision-making will ensure a 
more transparent and fair system for adjudicating claims. The current procedure 
requires clarification on a number of other significant aspects. Is a determination of 
the likelihood of innocence required? If so, what standard of proof is required and on 
whom does the burden of proof lie? What constitutes ‘conclusive facts’? 
Without clear guidance, there is a danger that discretion will only be exercised 
in high profile cases that have created a political or popular reaction. It is important 
that all (potential) claimants are treated equally. The present scheme is overly 
restrictive and does not seem to accord with the policy objectives behind its 
introduction – to deal with the harmful consequences of the lengthy detention that 
results from international prosecutions. Reliance on (guided) judicial discretion, rather 
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than strict (but undefined) explicit criteria, to decide on eligibility will ensure the 
system can actually provide an effective remedy to counteract the harm caused.  
 
 
6. Rethinking redress 
 
If a claimant is deemed eligible for an award under Article 85(3), the designated 
Chamber must decide on the amount of compensation (if any) to award.
272
 This 
section explores the factors considered by judges in making this decision and what 
compensation, as a remedy, is meant to address. It proceeds to advocate a more 
holistic approach to the design and delivery of remedial justice that goes beyond 
financial recompense.  
 
 
6.1 Compensation 
 
Compensation is a retrospective remedy that should provide damages for what 
has been lost as a result of the harm caused.
273
 This section examines what the remedy 
of compensation should entail, how the quantum of awards should be determined and 
how awards granted can be delivered. 
 
 
6.1.1 The remedy of compensation 
 
According to the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, compensation to 
persons who are not convicted of the offence for which they are remanded in custody 
could cover ‘loss of income, loss of opportunities and moral damage’.274 In other 
words, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages can be sought.  
Pecuniary damages would include financial recompense for lost past and future 
earnings and pensions, reductions in property values or property loss (taking account 
of inflation and the devaluation of currency), past and present pain, suffering and 
injury to physical and mental health, punitive fines,
275
 and legal fees and expenses.
276
  
Non-pecuniary damages provide for moral injury and dignity violations such as 
harm to reputation, fear, humiliation and mental distress; loss of enjoyment of life; 
loss of consortium and interference with family relationships.
277
 As the intangible and 
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subjective nature of these forms of harm can make them difficult to prove or reflect in 
monetary terms, such damages are often presumed.
278
  
It is important to note the inclusion of the word ‘any’ in the Rule 175.279 This 
was inserted to highlight the fact that such compensation is not a right but a 
discretionary power of the Chamber.
280
 In other words, overcoming the eligibility 
thresholds will not necessarily result in an award of compensation. This suggests that 
a declaratory judgment could be handed down. This is doubtful for several reasons. 
Firstly, there has been no violation of an enumerated right to make a declaration 
about. Secondly, the ECtHR’s practice of refusing to award compensation for 
recognised violations of Article 5(5) (ruling that a declaration of violation provides 
just satisfaction) has received sustained criticism.
281 
Judge Robinson at the ICTY has 
argued that the formal recognition of a violation of the right to a fair trial (undue 
delay) does not provide a sufficient remedy, particularly where the breach is 
substantial and causes claimants psychological non-pecuniary damage: financial 
compensation is required in such cases.
282
 Finally, a decision to award no 
compensation to claimants that have established exceptional circumstances and the 
occurrence of a GMMOJ is unlikely to be considered appropriate given the objectives 
of the Court (ending impunity, respect for victims and human rights protection). 
Compensatory damages could also be nominal (symbolic), but this too is 
unlikely to be appropriate under this scheme. The level of damages awarded should 
be proportionate to the harm caused,
283
 and it is important that ‘real compensation and 
not mere damages must be awarded’.284 It is unclear, however, what level of awards 
the drafters of Article 85(3) anticipated. Zejnil Delalic (detained for over two and a 
half years at the UNDU) sought €255 000 euros in compensation for legal fees, 
suffering in detention, loss of earnings and the collapse of his construction business in 
Austria, while Vlatko Kupreskić sought a minimum of US $10 million for the harm 
he suffered as a result of three years in detention.
285
 In a recent claim submitted to the 
MICT, although it was acknowledged that it was ‘difficult to attach a price tag’286 to 
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the loss of liberty, freedoms, income, reputation and family life, the claimant sought 
one million US dollars.
287 
The amount of compensation awarded by regional human rights courts to 
applicants claiming under provisions similar to Articles 85(1) and (2) are often lower 
than expected
288
 (although awards to applicants with successful claims of excessive 
delay at trial were significantly higher if the accused person was later acquitted when 
compared to awards granted to persons found guilty).
289
 Jurisprudence reveals that 
this could be attributed to the fact that many claimants seeking compensation for 
human rights violations often fail to clearly articulate or substantiate (with evidence 
or legal argumentation) the heads or items of their claims.
290
 Although it is not stated 
in the rules, it is likely that the claimant will have to (and should be advised to) 
provide specific, itemised grounds and demonstrate with evidence that the harm 
claimed both occurred and was caused by (or that it was reasonably foreseeable that it 
would be caused by) the charges and subsequent detention by the ICC.
291
 Though the 
burden of proof will generally fall on the claimant, it is possible for the burden to be 
shifted to the Prosecutor once causation has been established.
 
 
The judges, when considering the amount to award, are obliged to consider the 
consequences of the grave and manifest miscarriage of justice on a range of factors 
derived from human rights jurisprudence.
292
 It seems that only the consequences of 
the GMMOJ for the claimant must be considered, and not the causes. Given the 
operational realities faced by the ICC, miscarriages of justice are likely to be 
attributed to structural causes rather than the acts or omissions of individuals.
293
 
Therefore although aggravated and punitive damages are theoretically available in 
addition to restitutionary damages under Article 85(3), they are unlikely.  
 
 
6.1.2 Determining the quantum of an award 
 
While the claimant may request a particular sum of compensation (Rule 
173(4)), the amount (if any) to be awarded is to be determined by the designated 
Chamber (Rule 175). If the remedy is intended to address the consequences for the 
claimant on his personal, family, social and professional situation,
294
 these must be 
assessed.  
The perceived impartiality of such assessment is crucial given that it will form 
the basis of the official response to a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice. While 
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the deciding judges cannot have been involved in the claimant’s trial at any stage, 
they are still officials of the institution responsible for the harm caused. Independent 
input is critical in a compensation scheme that depends on discretion and that does not 
allow for the review of decisions. Moreover, such assessments are difficult and 
complex and international judges will not necessarily have the expertise required to 
determine the impact of the miscarriage of justice and the quantum and form of 
redress required to address this harm. On account of the need to ensure impartiality 
and the complex nature of such assessments, it is recommended that a team of 
independent experts be appointed to carry out this task. 
In addition to taking caution in relation to arriving at a suitable and sufficient 
sum for any award, it is also important that the levels of any awards granted are 
justified. Sums awarded without reason or reference to pre-established guidelines risk 
being considered arbitrary and unfair.
295
 Unfortunately, little guidance can be drawn 
from the jurisprudence of other international courts. The ICJ’s discussion of the 
principles for determining the quantum of compensation has been criticised for being 
vague.
296
 The ECtHR has also been criticised. Shelton notes that ‘it remains hard to 
observe the workings of any principled decision-making’297 and that decisions on 
damages are often notable for their ‘lack of analysis or articulation of principles in 
regard to assessing damages ( . . . ) the Court never discusses the basis for the awards 
it makes, leaving much to speculation’.298 The interpretation and application of the 
right to compensation in human rights law remains undeveloped in many respects
299
 
and decisions often ‘do not attempt to quantify the harm [or] award precise relief’.300 
Due to the lack of practice to draw from, and the need to ensure a fair system, the ICC 
should adopt a practice direction or guidelines to govern such decision-making and 
ensure that decisions include precise and principled reasoning to ensure the 
development of a coherent body of jurisprudence. 
 
 
6.1.3 Limiting the amount that can be awarded?  
 
In addition to the difficulties associated with arriving at the sum to award, 
compensation schemes also create budgeting problems. Accordingly, some domestic 
systems rely on grids to set or restrict amounts that can be awarded for pecuniary 
damages.
301
 National legislation can fix the amount that can be granted in relation to 
the time served in detention.
302
 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, awards have 
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been based on a per diem rate.
303
 Limits on the total amount that can be awarded, 
irrespective of the time actually served, are also possible.
304
 Fixed amounts can make 
it easier for judges to decide how much to award, for the institution to budget for 
potential claims and for claimants to predict the level of award they should receive.
305
 
The idea of adopting a maximum amount for awards received support in relation to 
Article 85(3).
306
 
However, setting such sums is difficult. They would need to be regularly 
reviewed and adjusted to ensure they reflect contemporary costs of living and 
inflation rises. Moreover, as Manns argues, while per diem or per annum rates of 
compensation might minimise administrative costs, they ignore the opportunity costs 
of detention and may result in the grant of symbolic or nominal sums that do not 
reflect the harm suffered by individuals.
 307
 What a system that uses damage schedules 
gains by providing a ‘simple, efficient and economical resolution of claims,’ it loses 
by limiting claims to economic loss.
308
 
Rather than adopt a fixed approach or limit the maximum amount that can be 
granted, the judges could be left to use their discretion. This would ensure that the 
award reflects the costs imposed on the individual claimant. This would also appear to 
be a fairer and fuller method of redress when considered in light of the problems of 
using what are necessarily arbitrary caps.
309
 The wording of Rule 175 would suggest 
that the judges are required to undertake a subjective assessment of the impact of the 
miscarriage of justice on the individual claimant rather than an objective approach 
that seeks to standardise the amounts awarded. The grant of judicial discretion to 
determine what amount is appropriate in each case enables the remedy ‘to reflect the 
real costs of pre-trial detention more comprehensively’.310 Allowing for the recovery 
of all proximate or foreseeable damage can ensure a ‘more complete recovery’.311 On 
the other hand, reliance on wholly discretionary and individualised awards makes it 
‘extremely difficult to adequately budget ( . . . ) and to ensure a consistent source of 
funding’. 312  
A hybrid approach could be adopted that sets a floor and cap, as well as daily or 
yearly rates, but that also allows for additional recovery based on assessments of the 
opportunity costs for individuals.
313
 However, this does not remove the difficulties 
associated with fixing rates or limits. For the ICC, it will be very difficult to set limits 
                                                        
303
 40-70 convertible marks per day. See Mackic (n 205). 
304
 See Table 1 in Norris (n 206) 7; L.C. Boucher, ‘Advancing the argument in favor of state 
compensation for the erroneously convicted and wrongfully incarcerated’ (2006) 56 Catholic 
University Law Review 1069, 1087; J. Costa, ‘Alone in the World: The United States’ Failure to 
Observe the International Human Right to Compensation for Wrongful Conviction’ (2005) 19 Emory 
International Law Review 1615, 1639; Lonergan (n 76) 420-2. 
305
 Manns (n 62) 51. 
306
 See Bitti (n 111) 635; Zappalà (n 2) 1585. 
307
 Manns (n 62) 51. 
308
 Sheehy (n 64) 998. 
309
 Lonergan (n 76) 423. 
310
 Manns (n 62) 51. 
311
 Sheehy (n 64) 998. 
312
 Costa (n 304) 1625. 
313
 Manns (n 62) 52. 
 41 
that reflect the standard of living relevant to all potential claimants. For example, in 
making a recommendation for a floor and cap for awards for violations of Article 5 
ECHR, Treschel opted for a per diem rate with a range of between €50 to €1 000. He 
acknowledged that this range was ‘both broad and very rough’ but felt it was 
necessary to ‘enable the cost of living in the relevant states to be factored in’. Yet he 
also argued that the most important consideration should be that ‘the compensation is 
substantial enough to highlight the value of personal liberty’.314 In relation to the ICC 
system, Michels proposed that the amount of compensation should be fixed at a daily 
rate of €70. This does not seem to allow for differences in the cost of living or the 
varying impact the detention may have had on the individual.  
What is interesting is that using this proposed sum (€70 per day), Michels 
calculated that in 2010, the ICTY would have been liable to pay €790 510 in 
compensation to ten individuals who had, collectively, spent over 11 000 days in 
custody.
 315
 This calculation dispels concerns that such rights would have detrimental 
financial impact. This would amount to 0.34% of the annual budget of the ICTY. And 
this is assuming that all persons would qualify for compensation. Schemes based on 
narrow eligibility or judicial discretion, such as the one established by Article 85(3), 
are likely to be a ‘negligible public expense’.316 
 
 
6.1.4 Delivering financial compensation 
 
While it is not stated explicitly, any awards granted under Article 85(3), as 
expenses of the Court, would be payable from the funds of the Court.
317
 It is likely 
that any (successful) decision will state a total sum of compensation to be awarded to 
the claimant. There is no guidance about how such awards should be delivered. The 
sum could be transferred in a final lump sum. However, it is also possible to consider 
the use of regular instalments. While the payment of instalments might be considered 
an unjustifiably paternalistic approach if based on a view that the claimant is 
incapable of managing their own money,
 318
 this approach may be warranted on two 
grounds. Firstly, it may be appropriate where it has been established that the 
claimant’s needs may vary over time or where they cannot be identified or accurately 
assessed at the time of the claim and therefore require on-going and continuous 
assessment. In this case, it may be appropriate to award an initial sum to compensate 
for the time spent in detention and associated costs with further assessed yearly sums 
to cover on-going and arising needs. Secondly, a regular payment option may be 
easier for the budget to absorb. This should not be taken to detract from the fact that 
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international organisations have a duty to ensure they have finances in place to 
provide remedies where they have committed international wrongs.
319
 
 
 
6.2 Other forms of redress 
 
As the previous section outlined, the rules focus on the determination of an 
amount (if any) of compensation to be awarded. The current legal framework does not 
therefore cater for non-compensatory or indeed, non-monetary redress. This differs 
from the broader approach adopted by the STL rules, which state that other forms of 
redress may be granted.
320
 As the consequences of a miscarriage of justices can be 
both erosive and cumulative,
321
 it may not be possible to restore the status quo ante 
with recourse to financial compensation alone. While compensation can have an 
‘ameliorative, restorative and therapeutic function’,322 some feel that when dealing 
with the complex harm caused by the loss of liberty, this traditional, monetary remedy 
is inadequate.
323
 European penal policy recognises that ‘although the damage suffered 
in many cases will require financial compensation, other forms of reparation may be 
more appropriate’.324 International policy states that international organisations should 
provide a range of remedies including restitution, reparation, compensation and 
satisfaction.
325
 Given the detrimental consequences of wrongful prosecution and 
detention, it may be necessary to ensure the availability of a form of remedy that can 
provide, inter alia, reputational repair, rehabilitative support and reintegration 
assistance. This section advocates moving beyond a solely monetary approach to 
remedies and proposes the adoption of a more comprehensive redress system. 
 
 
6.2.1 Remedial responsiveness 
 
Zdenkowski argues for a ‘making amends’ model of redress for wrongfully 
convicted persons, as ‘it is not possible to reverse history and restore an individual 
with complete integrity to his former position’. 326  He argues, however, that it is 
‘possible to take account of what has happened and to attempt to be responsive to 
those changes’.327 This idea of being remedially responsive to the impact detention 
has had on an individual’s life course has found expression in human rights law as 
‘proyecto de vida’.  
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The I-ACtHR, basing this concept on autonomy, noted that remedies granted on 
this ground should reflect the irreparable loss or severe impairment of opportunities 
for professional and personal development caused by an encroachment on an 
individual’s rights.328 In other words, claimants should be viewed as more than ‘mere 
agent[s] of economic production’.329  
Disappointingly, however, no award was made on this ground due to the 
difficulties of translating the concept into monetary terms: access to the court and the 
decision were held to constitute satisfaction.
330
 Despite this, the concept can be and 
has been utilised to provide a normative basis for non-monetary remedies. For 
example, in the Cantoral Benavides case, Peru was required to pay for a university 
scholarship and associated living costs to one of the victims.
331 
This concept could be 
developed to provide a principled basis for devising and awarding non-financial 
remedies at the ICC.  
There is already practice of the grant of non-monetary remedies at the ICTR. In 
the Rwamakuba case, the Trial Chamber directed the Registrar to ensure that Mr 
Rwamakuba received, in addition to financial compensation, a public apology, 
assistance with resettlement for him and his family and with his children’s 
education.
332
 This approach seems to take a rehabilitative approach to restitution that 
focuses on restoring a person’s reputation and health, and assisting with their 
reintegration into society.
333
  
 
 
6.2.2 Reputational repair 
 
The social stigma associated with being a former international detainee will 
vary with each claimant. For some it has not prevented their appointment or 
continuation in government positions.
334
 An international indictment, arrest, 
prosecution and detention will often, however, attract global media attention. These 
actions, and the attendant publicity, can have a punitive and stigmatising effect that 
endures long after the formal termination of the international criminal justice 
process.
335 
Even for acquitted persons, or persons against whom proceedings have 
been terminated, the mere existence of formal accusations can result in an enduring 
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presumption of guilt.
336
 As a Deputy Registrar at the ICTR noted, although 
defendants ‘can’t get more innocent than seven or eight judges telling the world that 
they are innocent ( . . . ) [s]omehow, the fact that they have been indicted haunts them 
for the rest of their existence’. 337  Heller argues that the international community 
should ensure that acquitted persons do not continue to ‘suffer the legal stigma of 
being accused’.338  
Official apologies are often sought as a form of satisfaction. Apologies can both 
provide an explicit acknowledgement of the harm caused and prevent the same thing 
from happening again by creating awareness of the causes of the problem.
339 
Apologies can assist with reputational repair. So can simple practical steps such as 
making the fact of the acquittal or termination of proceeding as prominent on the 
websites of the international courts as the fact of their indictment. Publicity notices 
can also be placed in international and local media. For example, in Japan a grant of 
compensation to acquitted accused persons will be published in the official journal 
and three newspapers of the claimant’s choice.340 
Although it has been argued by international officials that a formal apology can 
suffice,
341
 an apology should be seen as supplementary or additional form of redress 
only and not a substitute for a proper remedy. 
 
 
6.2.3 Dealing with trauma 
 
It is necessary to recognise that the mental health needs of claimants ‘may be 
complex and substantial’.342 Research has shown that wrongful detention can have 
long-lasting and significant consequences such as long-term personality change, post-
traumatic stress and other psychiatric disorders.
343
 Accordingly, remedies should 
include psychological and psychiatric support services that address any trauma caused 
by the wrongful detention.
344
 Treatment needs can be immediate, to address specific 
conditions such as PTSD or depression, but also longer-term, requiring counselling to 
come to terms with the time lost on account of their deprivation of liberty.
345
 
Although this latter form of trauma can have a long-term impact on the claimant’s 
physical and mental health, it can be difficult to assess at the time of release.
346
 Rather 
than continually reassess such needs, the ICC could consider providing relevant 
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persons with long-term or life-long medical insurance to cover the costs of any 
required interventions.
347
 
 
 
6.2.4 Reintegration support 
 
Wrongfully convicted persons in domestic criminal justice systems tend to ‘fall 
on the periphery of any existing social service relief measures’, 348  with little to 
nothing being done to ‘ease the transition from prison to the real world’. 349  The 
situation is worse in the international criminal justice system, where there is no 
support for any released person.
350
 Even the new conditional release system instituted 
by the SCSL, fails in this regard, focusing more on supervision than support.
351
 This 
means that acquitted accused (or persons against whom proceedings have been 
terminated) at the ICC will not have access to any established reintegration support 
measures. This is unfortunate given the lengthy periods of detention likely to be 
involved in such cases. In addition to the usual reintegration problems faced by 
released persons (institutionalisation, health and relationship issues), persons released 
following a grave and manifest miscarriage of justice at the ICC may also have to deal 
with resettlement in a post-conflict society still in transition. 
Acquitted persons in the international context may require access to a scheme 
that can ‘perform a stepping-stone function between prison and society and between 
war and peace’. 352  Detention at the seat of the Court in The Hague may mean, 
however, that acquitted accused persons cannot benefit from national demobilisation, 
peace-building or reconciliation programmes in their country of origin.
353
 Moreover, a 
post-conflict society may not have a functioning probation system to provide support 
to released persons at a national level. This discussion assumes however, that the 
released persons can travel to their country of origin. Practice has shown that 
acquitted accused persons may face significant legal and practical problems that 
prevent their relocation. 
 
 
6.2.5 Relocation 
 
Release from detention following an acquittal at an international court has not 
always resulted in freedom. As the cases outlined in Section 2.5 above demonstrate, 
release following an acquittal can result in further custody in administrative detention, 
(threatened) deportation to a country were the individual fears persecution and 
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restricted freedom of movement and association if they remain in the Host State. For 
Mr Ngudjolo, his ‘acquittal instead became a nightmare. The trauma of his 
incarceration increased by the day ( . . . ) [he was] on the verge of depression as he 
had trouble understanding how such treatment could be inflicted on an acquitted 
person’.354 Serious detrimental consequences of a miscarriage of justice can therefore 
continue after an acquittal or termination of proceedings in the international criminal 
justice context. Despite an explicit and negotiated division of responsibility between 
the ICC and the Dutch government in relation to the duty to relocate,
355 
de facto 
statelessness and a legal limbo was imposed on the first person to be acquitted by the 
Court. As Heller argues, while the ICTR ‘has proven admirably protective of its 
acquittees ( . . . ) acquitted defendants should not have to choose between living as 
virtual prisoners under international protection and returning home to face significant 
physical and legal dangers’.356 
The ICC, conscious of the need to deal with this issue, drafted a model 
agreement that can be entered between the Court and States in the ‘event that a 
suspect acquitted by the Court would not be able to return to their State of 
nationality’.357 Like the ICTR,358 however, the ICC cannot oblige a State to grant 
asylum or residency rights: ‘the reception of both an acquitted person and a protected 
witness is completely reliant on the voluntary cooperation of a State’.359 Cooperation 
in this regard remains vitally important, not only to protect the fundamental rights of 
acquitted accused persons, but also to ensure respect for the Court’s judgments.360  
 
 
6.2.6 Re-entry support  
 
A finding of not guilty and subsequent release may only be the beginning of a 
long and difficult transition period.
361
 Persons who can claim under Article 85(3) are 
likely to have been released suddenly without the preparation, support and 
supervision normally provided to long-term prisoners due to be released in domestic 
systems. Such released persons can face the same challenges as other institutionalised 
persons, such as adapting to their regained freedom, changes in their family life and 
advances in technology.
362
 While most adapt to practical changes, such as new 
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technologies, in relatively short periods of time,
363  
dealing with the impact of 
institutionalisation may take longer. They may also face problems associated with the 
operational difficulties faced by international courts. 
Re-entry support in this context is therefore vital. The re-entry requirements of 
each individual should be assessed and such assessments should form part of the 
discussion about the appropriate form of redress to grant. Re-entry assistance will be 
required immediately before and after release, but also over the longer term. 
It is foreseeable that persons who have been declared indigent and detained for 
long periods of time in a foreign country without access to paid work (or available 
funds due to asset freezing) will have immediate financial needs upon release. They 
will have to pay for somewhere to live, food, clothing, insurance etc. The ICC should 
consider granting immediate transition loans (which could be deducted from any 
award made) or a grant to cover reasonable reintegration expenses incurred during 
this interim period that could be claimed in addition to compensatory damages.
364
 
Beyond these immediate basics, it can be more difficult to assess longer-term 
needs that may require other forms of assistance. It may be necessary to ensure that 
rather than view such support (only) as a remedy following a judicial decision on 
eligibility and merit, re-entry support should (also) be seen as an administrative 
responsibility of the Registry. It is already technically the Registry’s responsibility to 
relocate such persons. Further, both the ICTR and ICC have practice of directly 
supporting and being responsible for acquitted accused persons who cannot be 
relocated. But the responsibility is broader than supporting acquitted accused persons 
stuck in this legal stalemate.  
The potentially life altering consequences of international prosecution and 
detention discussed above will often necessitate more than financial recovery. This 
duty should be broadened to include all forms of reintegration support. The ICC’s 
Registry along with the Presidency’s Enforcement team should establish a Re-entry 
Team to ensure the enforcement of acquittal decisions and provide support to persons 
harmed by wrongful prosecutions. 
A dedicated re-entry team could provide the coordinated and multi-disciplinary 
support such persons require.
365
 Rather than assess such needs in an adversarial 
hearing, mediation could be used to discuss compensation claims and negotiate an 
individualised support package. A specialist team could provide a tailored approach to 
post-custody transition by assessing and delivering support in relation to both 
immediate and longer-term reintegration needs. This would involve a range of tasks 
such as organising access to accommodation upon release, and helping to secure and 
implement relocation treaties with cooperating States. 
 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
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Article 85(3)’s restrictive thresholds mean that persons deemed eligible are 
likely to have suffered a very significant degree of harm. If the underlying goal is to 
address the harmful consequences of international remand detention, the remedy 
should be tailored to provide meaningful support that helps claimants rebuild their 
lives. The ICC should seek independent and expert advice when assessing the 
quantity of compensation to award and the method of delivery. Guidelines should be 
developed to ensure a transparent and principled approach to decision-making. 
Further, the ICC should adopt a broader approach to remedy than simple 
compensation. In fact a more holistic scheme would appear to be required by evolving 
human rights jurisprudence, contemporary penological standards, international 
principles on international organisation responsibility, the ICJ operational context and 
an explicit internal regulatory duty to focus on the consequences. Using respect for 
human dignity as a base line, remedies should help to restore the individual’s 
autonomy and reputation and assist with rehabilitative and reintegrative needs.  
 
 
7. Dealing with the Costs of Suspicion in International Criminal Justice 
 
Issues related to acquittals in the international criminal justice field are 
increasingly attracting attention.
366
 The inclusion of Article 85(3) ICCSt represented a 
statutory recognition of the problems faced by such persons at the UN Tribunals and 
the judicial inability to respond to their situation in the absence of a legal right to 
compensation under international law.  
The lack of political willingness at the UNSC to grant this judicial power to the 
UN Tribunals (attributed to cost concerns and the temporary nature of these courts) 
was disappointing due to the priority these institutions placed on protecting the rights 
of accused persons.
 367
 The power included in Article 85(3) may be viewed as a 
‘logical corollary’368 to the due process approach adopted by the ICCSt that prioritises 
the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial. This new power in 
international (criminal) law bridges an important remedial gap. It reflects evolving 
law, policy and practice at both national and regional levels. It essentially provides the 
ICC with a scheme to address the costs of suspicion and related detention.  
While the ability to address the real and harmful consequences of wrongful 
international prosecution and detention is a welcome addition, both the objectives and 
the scope of the scheme are uncertain. Is this new judicial power an innovative step 
towards recognising the harm caused by excessive reliance on, and length of, 
detention in international criminal justice, or is it a legitimacy lever to be used to 
respond (or not) to instances of intense political reaction to judgments? On the one 
hand, Article 85(3) can be viewed as a form of social insurance that (re-)distributes 
the burden of international criminal justice process across society (and to an 
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institution with means to provide a remedy).
369
 By accepting responsibility for 
mistakes, the legitimacy of international criminal justice process and public 
confidence in its outcomes can be enhanced.
370
 Fairness also dictates the need for 
such a system on a number of grounds. As Beresford notes, it is illogical to 
compensate someone for an unlawful arrest but not for the harm caused by spending 
extended periods of time in detention.
371
 Moreover, convicted persons can offset the 
time they spend in pre-judgment custody against any sentence imposed.
372
  
On the other hand, however, acquittals in the international criminal justice 
context have the propensity to be extremely controversial.
373
 The discretionary basis 
of Article 85(3) may enable the Court to withhold a remedy in sensitive cases. There 
is also a danger that the provision can be used to address the costly impact of 
excessive detention without directly recognising violations of the right to liberty and a 
fair trial, and thereby as a means to avoid traditional remedies of release or re-trial. 
The new judicial power should not be used to commodify or pay for infringements of 
fundamental rights.
374
 The scheme should not be used to implicitly invert the illegality 
of situations of excessive detention in international remand centres.  
In relation to the scope of the scheme, the rules on eligibility and procedure will 
result in a very narrow range of potential claimants and a low likelihood of an award 
being made. The current eligibility thresholds (GMMMOJ and exceptional 
circumstances) should be removed. Guidelines and practice directions should be 
developed to define key terms, clarify requirements and set the foundation for 
principled decision-making. The appointed judges should be able to use their 
discretion to tailor the remedy to the individual claimant’s needs.  
In terms of the remedy that can be awarded, this requires independent and 
expert input. Moreover, the form of the remedy available should be broader than 
monetary recompense and the ICC should create a body tasked with the design and 
delivery of a comprehensive redress and support system that assists with reputational 
repair, rehabilitation and reintegration. 
To conclude, Article 85(3) is to be welcomed as an innovative and progressive 
development in international criminal law. However, it remains unclear in what 
circumstances and for what purpose this scheme will be used. The scheme requires 
refinement, the removal of unnecessary obstacles and the form of available redress 
needs to be reconsidered. 
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